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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor

Reflections on the Bork Nomination
The dispute over the nomination of Robert Bork
to the Supreme Court gives promise of being one of
those special issues that reveal with particular clarity
the fault lines of American politics. The struggle over
Bork's confirmation has already aroused ideological
passions and intensities unusual in our politics, and
there's lots more to come. The substantive and political consequences at stake are themselves of the greatest importance, and beyond them lies the realm of
symbolic politics in which the issue has been caught up
and which raises it to a whole new level of significance.
The controversy rages on two different planes of
contention . The first involves straight political and social outcomes. Since the present Court is closely balanced on a number of controverted issues, it is feared
(or hoped) that Bork will tip the scales to the conservative side on such policy matters as abortion, affirmative action, church-and-state issues, free speech, or
police search powers. From this perspective, the Bork
dispute boils down to an ideological confrontation, a
straight-out power struggle between Left and Right
that ought to be understood as such and resolved on
those grounds.
But the second plane of contention, though not unrelated to the policy dispute, extends and complicates
the argument and, at least for Bork's defenders, constitutes the proper grounds on which the issue should
be settled. In this view, judicial philosophy becomes
the central issue and Bork's doctrine of judicial restraint his primary virtue.
The doctrine of judicial restraint suggests that
judges should take a stringently self-denying view of
their task of judicial review. Theirs is not a policymaking function. Since, once appointed, they are removed from democratic accountability, they must
never presume to substitute their standards concerning the wisdom and virtue of public policy issues for
those of duly elected and responsible officers of government in the legislative and executive branches.
When engaged in review of the constitutionality of
acts of Congress or the Executive, they should give the
benefit of doubt of legitimacy to such actions. Laws of
Congress or activities of the President may properly be
invalidated only when they violate the clear meaning
and intent of the relevant constitutional provisions.
Judges should put restrictions on the people's democratically-expressed will only when the Constitution requires them to do so.
September, 1987

Thus, for example, a judge bound by judicial restraint who personally opposed the death penalty or
restrictions on abortion would nonetheless let pass
legislative initiatives in those areas because such initiatives, whatever their intellectual or moral worth, run
contrary to no clear constitutional stipulations. Those
who would expand the boundaries of reform should
have primary recourse to the political process, not the
courts. Judges have no role as Platonic guardians of the
true, the beautiful, and the good; put differently, the
people have the right to be wrong, except where their
unwisdom coincides with constitutional restrictions.
Critics of judicial restraint, observing its effects on
currently-disputed matters, sometimes argue that it is
little more than an elaborate conservative contrivance
for arriving at tory outcomes. But a moment's historical reflection suggests that such is not necessarily the
case. In the late nineteenth century and again during
the 1930s liberals urged just such restraint on judges
who engaged in expansive and tortured readings of
the Constitution in order to inhibit state and federal
attempts to regulate business activities. Judicial restraint (or judicial activism) has no inherent ideological
bias one way or another; everything depends on the issues under dispute. It is in itself a neutral principle.
It is true enough, of course, that judicial restraint
offers only a general approach to jurisprudence and
not a detailed blueprint for arriving at correct decisions in disputed cases. Like the associated doctrine of
original intent, judicial restraint constitutes a guideline
rather than a formula. One cannot read the Constitution the way fundamentalists read scripture, looking
for absolute assurance and precise prescription. At
many critical junctures, the words of the Constitution-and the intentions of its authors-are neither
self-evident in meaning nor amenable to definitive
explication. In places where we might yearn for detailed guidance we get only the expression of general
principle. Judicial review remains an inescapably interpretive, even subjective, activity in which men and
women of equal legal acumen and constitutional scholarship will legitimately arrive at conflicting conclusions.
When we add to these considerations the commonsense knowledge that fallible judges will often practice
judicial restraint when it coincides with their policy
preferences and find ingenious constitutional excuses
for not doing so when it does not, we can understand
the arguments of those who see the doctrine as an
exercise in mystification and obfuscation. Judicial m-
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terpretation, they insist, is inevitably a policy-making
process in which the personal biases of judges will
necessarily intrude, and it would be better to face that
reality directly rather than indulge in self-deceiving efforts to pretend that it is not so.
Yet if judicial restraint is not by itself a sufficient
judicial philosophy, it would seem to remain a necessary one. How else avoid the imposition of an imperial
judiciary that feels itself unconstrained by democratic
presuppositions? How else, to be more specific, avoid
the jurisprudence by whimsy of a Roe v. Wade, which
constructed a new constitutional doctrine out of sheer
judicial willfullness, or the improbable constitutional
construance of a Justice Brennan, who finds the death
penalty a "cruel and unusual punishment" within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment even though the
Constitution elsewhere makes explicit provision for
capital punishment?
Those who argue that the impossibility of pure judicial objectivity makes judicial restraint untenable
have no more plausible a case than those Christians
who would argue that their inevitable inability to exercise pure altruism justifies abandonment to unrestrained self-indulgence. We need perhaps most of all
those ideals we find it impossible fully to live up to.
What, then, of the Bork case? Those who oppose his
judicial philosophy, or find him regularly inconsistent
in its application, have every right to oppose him,
however qualified or even exceptional they might on
other grounds concede him to be, but those who
would reject him simply because they find that his
philosophy leads to uncongenial policy results would
by implication reduce our judicial system to a raw
struggle for power that will sooner rather than later
destroy the nation's faith in constitutional democracy.
It is distressing to find so much of the early opposition
to Bork consisting in disingenuous exercises in dubious faith, as in the largely sophistical attacks to which
he has been subjected in the New Yorker and the New
York Review of Books.

Some of Bork's detractors oppose him on the peculiar grounds that he is not a "moderate," as if only
those who locate themselves in the equivocal middle
display fit judicial temperament or as though there
were some unspoken constitutional doctrine that the
Court must at all times maintain perfect ideological
balance. (Where were such critics during the days of
the Warren Court?) To argue in this way is in effect
to nullify any President's right to nominate candidates
who fit his judicial preferences.
There is, finally, a political pitfall of which Judge
Bork's opponents in the Democratic party ought to be
more aware than many of them appear to be (and we
offer this, however unlikely it may seem, in a nonpar4

tisan spirit). For some time now, the Democratic party
has labored under the disabling suspicion that it is excessively responsive to extremist or marginal elements
in national politics. It will continue to be difficult for
Democrats to elect a President if they are perceived as
a party captive to the demands of feminists, racial
militants, gays, and ideological purists.
Much of the opposition to Bork has the mood of
McGovernism revisited. (See, for example, Senator
Kennedy's semi-hysterical outburst on the day the
nomination was announced.) It might very well lead to
the same results. The more the struggle over the
nomination becomes, as indicated at the outset, a study
in symbolic politics, the more likely are the Democrats
to come to grief over it.
Cl

Dorothy Czamanske, 1905-1987
The loss of Dorothy Czamanske last spring of heart
failure is one that all of us associated with The Cresset
feel deeply. We have lost a good friend and a valued
colleague. We join with her family in mourning her
departure.
She was a pious Christian and a demon copy editor.
Those ascriptions may seem more alien to each other
than they actually are. Her Lutheran Christian faith
anchored itself in a scriptural affirmation from which
she never wavered. As eagle-eyed copy editor, she
held with fundamentalist conviction to her second
scripture: Kate Turabian's Chicago Manual of Style. She
clung to the latter, as to the former, as a rock of certitude in a relativistic world.
Her husband Palmer was for many years a professor
in Valparaiso University's Department of English, and
she held as he did to a firmly prescriptive approach to
the understanding of English grammar. After Palmer
died, she served under three different Cresset employers-Kenneth Korby, Richard Lee, and the presenteditor-as guardian of the grammatical proprieties. She
was never a latitudinarian . When her putative
superiors erred in that direction. she accepted their
derelictions with resigned good grace, but also with an
unmistakable air of gentle reproval. Her mastery of
the rudiments and rules of style made her for years
the editor and typist of choice for members of the university faculty preparing their dissertations for final
approval.
Dorothy Czamanske loved the English language and
served it vigilantly and faithfully. So also with her
more important loves: family, church, university, community. She gave us all tough love and left us all the
better for it. We will miss her.
Cl
The Cresset

Richard John Neuhaus

ABORTION AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
A Response to James V. Bachman

(Editor's note: Last March, The Cresset published james
V. Bachman's "Of Pluralism, Truth, and Abortion: A Constructive Role for Skepticism in Public Discourse." In that
essay, Pastor Bachman took issue with certain arguments put
forward by Pastor Neuhaus. Herewith Pastor Neuhaus' rejoinder.)

I am grateful for Pastor Bachman's analysis of the
ongoing abortion debate and of my efforts to contribute to that debate. I agree entirely with his statement
that "What is wanted is a way to return careful, public
reasoning to the public sphere, even and precisely
where disagreement persists." And it appears we do
not substantively disagree on what public policy should
be with respect to abortion. He gives that question
parenthetical mention in one sentence (literally within
parentheses) but it is a sentence I can readily affirm:
"In a debate about relative risks I would initially suspect that, given our ignorance, it is preferable to risk
prohibition of abortions of convenience than to risk
free choice."
But the gravamen of Bachman's extensive essay is
not what abortion policy should be but how we should
conduct the debate about what abortion policy should
be. Before turning to the heart of his argument, however, at least two errors of fact should be noted. They
are errors of fact that may indeed, upon closer examination, touch upon the heart of his argument.
The first error is Bachman's repeated assertion that
Roe v. Wade permits "first trimester abortions." Roe v.

Richard John Neuhaus , who was awarded an honorary
degree from Valparaiso University last May, is Director of
The Center on Religion and Society in New York City. His
most recent books include The Naked Public Square
(1984) and Dispensations: The Future of South Africa
as South Africans See It (1986). His new book, The
Catholic Moment, is scheduled for publication by Harper
& Row this fall.
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Wade removes legal protection from the unborn up
until the moment of birth. No reason for abortion can
be required before "viability." In the final months before birth, a threat to the woman's health may be a
prerequisite for obtaining an abortion, but a threat to
health is defined very broadly indeed. So, while there
are relatively few third trimester abortions, they are
certainly permitted and are obtained when they are
wanted and doctors are willing to do them. (Individual
justices and the Court have subsequently acknowledged the arbitrariness and disutility of the "trimester"
as a concept.)

Pastor Bachman repeatedly asserts
that Roe v. Wade permits "first
trimester abortions." In fact, Roe
removes legal protection from the
unborn up until the moment of birth.
This question of fact is important because it bears
strongly upon what Bachman calls the "risks" involved
in policy options. Today the theory and practice justified by Roe v. Wade are, quite logically and routinely,
invoked to justify infanticide and euthanasia. As is
now very widely recognized, there is nothing in the
reasoning of Roe v. Wade that limits the permissions it
grants to the first trimester or, for that matter, to the
unborn.
The second error also has to do with Roe v. Wade
and relates to both a reading of historical circumstance
and of the nature of public moral discourse. Bachman
repeatedly asserts that the debate over abortion policy
had reached a political deadlock and moral impasse,
and that this was the unpromising situation to which
the Court had to address itself. I respectfully suggest
that this depiction is contrary to fact.
As an active participant in the "abortion liberalization" debate of the 1960s that was underway in New
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York and other states, I can assure Pr. Bachman that
democratic political discourse regarding abortion was
vibrant and tractable, if not always terribly elevated.
Far from having run its course, the debate had hardly
gotten underway before the Court peremptorily removed it from the "public reasoning in the public
square" that Bachman and I both favor.
It is a matter of record that the pro-liberalization
forces were stunned--even if delightedly stunned-by
the sweeping nature of the Court's 1973 decision. As
the great constitutional scholar John T. Noonan has
observed, the Court did not liberalize abortion law, it
abolished abortion law-a step unprecedented in the
history of western jurisprudence. It is also no secret
that many who favored "liberalized abortion" at the
time have had second thoughts about the "victory"
handed them by the Court. They wanted abortions to
be available in "extreme circumstances." They did not
envision 1.5 million abortions per year and the almost
20 million unborn lives terminated since Roe v. Wade.
The essential point, however, is that the impasse in
democratic discourse described by Bachman was not
the situation addressed by the Court; it is the situation
created by the Court. And the impasse now is not in
democratic discourse with respect to abortion; it is an
impasse--one hopes a temporary impasse-in resolving the conflict between the imperial judiciary and the
democratic political process. This question has everything to do with Bachman's reading of the possibilities
and limits of public reason and persuasion.
There is a second part to what I have described as
Bachman's second error. Perhaps this second part is
more in the nature of an attendant question. Bachman
writes that the Court was correct in saying that, with
respect to when life begins, "when those trained in the
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the
judiciary, at this point in the development of man's
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the
answer."
But then Bachman acknowledges that the Court did
in fact give an answer, and it was a "reductionist" answer of which he disapproves. Had he a better reading
of the history of the debate (see above) , Bachman
might have concluded that, in the absence of a "consensus" either among the public or among specialists,
it would have been the better part of wisdom for the
Court not to decide the question as it did, perhaps not
to decide the question at all. Not even the forces that
brought the case were asking the Court to abolish
abortion law.
Even more seriously, Bachman (borrowing the
phrase from John Rawls) says the Court respected the
"veil of ignorance" which had "descended upon con-
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temporary public debate about abortion ." With the
Court, Bachman thinks evidence of such a veil of ignorance is the absence of "consensus" among relevant experts. On many questions of consequence, however,
experts are "unable to arrive at any consensus." Are all
such questions therefore to be removed from public
discourse and decision? And where would that leave
the theory and practice of a system of representative
democracy such as we claim to have? Bachman says
the argument he is making about the abortion debate
applies more generally to other debates over public
policy. If he really does agree with the hapless piece
of reasoning that he cites from Roe v. Wade, it is to be
feared that his complaint is with democratic polity itself.
So far I have suggested that Bachman's admirable
intention is marred by two errors, the second of which
raises the several questions mentioned. The constructive part of Bachman's effort is in the proposal that
there are four distinct moral modes, so to speak, in
engaging public policy debate, and the abortion debate
in particular. There is the moral skeptic (which is how
he identifies himself), there is the moral absolutist (apparently proponents of natural law and universal
reason belong here) , there is the moral relativist (he
says the present writer belongs here, when he is not
being an absolutist), and then the moral reductionist

Possum
On a flat, white rock at mid-day we found her,
an unmoving ridge parting ceaseless waters.
My cousin and I stood knee-deep,
child footed on uneven stones,
noon flared all around us,
this unexpected island taking us separately.
We lacked language strong enough
to bury the possum.
We left her there, afraid to touch,
thinking death itself contagious.
When Steve died
I blinked at the blueness
of his burial suit,
saw the straight spine of his mother
who chose three hymns
for us to sing while we wept,
heavy with language.

Margot Cullen

The Cresset
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(who, properly in my judgment, gets short shrift).
The way that Bachman sets up his four categories is
intriguing, even if so confusing as to raise the question
as to whether they are fundamentally confused. There
is also a piquant touch in that Bachmn wickedly mixes
up the conventional categories for thinking about moral
actors in the public arena. For instance, the Jerry Falwell types, who are ever railing against relativism, end
up as relativists all in Bachman's scheme of things.
But we should step back a moment and get a firmer
fix on Bachman's four moral modes. The "skeptic"
thinks there is a true answer to the question, but also
thinks we probably don't have that true answer. (The
question in question would seem to be the question
about the beginning of human life, although this becomes ambiguous as the essay proceeds.) The "absolutist" says there is a true answer and all human beings are capable of giving it. The "relativist" says there
are several truths in play, and works to make sure that
his truth prevails. The "reductionist" claims that all
talk about moral truth is no more than a smokescreen
for something else, usually self-interest.
So there are Pr. Bachman's four types. The skeptic
is the good guy, the absolutist may be well intended
but is stubbornly wrongheaded, the relativist may be
sincere but tends to be slippery and manipulative. As
for the reductionist, enough said.
"An absolutist would argue that there is one true account about whether abortion in the first trimester is
right or not and that this truth can be publicly determined and shared," Bachman writes. What is meant by
"right or not" is not explained. Presumably, it is not
"right" if it is the taking of an innocent human life. As
an exmple of absolutism, Bachman cites my citation of
James Burtchaell of Notre Dame. Burtchaell argues
that Christian "wisdom" with respect to abortion is
publicly accessible. That is, properly argued, it will be
convincing to reasonable people who are not Christians. In this respect, Burtchaell embraces a natural
law position that is deeply compatible with a Lutheran
understanding of natural reason, civic righteousness,
or orders of preservation.
It does seem a bit mischievous of Bachman to dub
this the "absolutist" position, considering the pejorative
connotation of "absolutism" in our culture. The position represented by Burtchaell is in fact the single
most venerable tradition of moral reasoning in western
civilization, threading its way from Aristotle through
Paul, Augustine, Maimonides, Thomas, Luther, Calvin, and up to a good many religious and secular thinkers today who persist in believing that moral discourse
is a human possibility.
In any event, while grudgingly admiring the "absolutist," Bachman thinks his is a lost cause and he
September, 1987

should therefore adopt the "skeptic" mode in public
discourse. Bachman asks in italics, "What public stance
should a rational person take when he recognizes that his private convictions cannot command rational agreement in public discourse?" Bachman's answer is that he should take
a "skeptic" stance.
But Bachman's question is filled with difficulties.
The whole point of the argument advanced by people
such as Burtchaell is that theirs is not a "private" conviction. In addition: What constitutes "rational agreement in public discourse"? Unanimous agreement?
Majority agreement? Consensus? Are we talking about
agreement in public opinion or among significant participants in the discourse? And how would the proponent of reasonable public moral discourse determine
that his argument "cannot" command agreement?

The participant whom Bachman
describes as the "absolutist" might
better be called a moral philosopher.
In the abortion debate he attempts
to make the public case for what
he believes to be the truth (not
simply "his truth").
With respect to the debate over abortion policy, one
might suggest that the measure of agreement required
is a politically effective convergence of moral j udgments and interests strong enough to secure an accommodation that, while entirely satisfactory to few, will
be compatible with the values of a democratic and
pluralistic society. Contra Bachman's "cannot," there is
every reason to believe such an agreement could be
achieved, absent the Court's preemption of democratic
deliberation. There is also every reason to believe that
those who make the kind of argument which Bachman
describes as "absolutist" can contribute, as they indeed
have contributed, to achieving such agreement.
The actor whom Bachman describes as the "absolutist" might better be called a moral philosopher. In
the abortion debate he attempts to make the public
case for what he believes to be the tru th (not simply
"his truth"). In this sense he is no different from the
"skeptic" Pr. Bachman, who is, after all, attempting to
make the case for the truth of what we know, or do
not know, about the truth. As to whether the moral
philosopher can in fact convince others, the debate
isn't over until it is over. (And the debate over the
questions raised by abortion will not, God willing, be
over in our lifetime.) In that debate the role of the
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"relativist" is as troubling as Bachman says.
Here too, however, there is considerable confusion
in Bachman's description of the "relativist" category.
The relativist allows that there are a number of truths
in contention and is only concerned that his truth prevail in public policy. He "will not waste his effort trying to reason with his opponents" but will use "all the
tools of persuasion" to carry the day politically.
Bachman says the relativist will, for strategic reasons,
allow that conflicting positions are "falsehood free." But
that seems exceedingly improbable, since anyone who is
trying to persuade people of his position is not likely to
allow that opposing positions are free of falsehood.

Bachman's proposal for recasting the
abortion debate in terms of risk is
ingenuous (not, please note,
disingenuous). For two decades
innumerable prolife advocates have
in fact been urging their opponents
to entertain the "what if" question.
In fact those whom Bachman calls "relativists" do
not make that allowance at all. Bachman's relativists
are more readily recognized as absolutists, in the
pejorative sense of the latter term. They reject the responsibilities of public reason and persuasion (persuasion being a perfectly respectable term, despite
Bachman's peculiar way of using it) because their
"truth" is essentially derived from private sources. For
the fundamentalist "prolifer," that truth is derived
from divine revelation which is not subject to public
reason. For many "prochoice" proponents, that truth
is coterminous with individual convenience or fulfillment and protected by the dogma of privacy. By declining the obligation of genuinely public discourse,
both of these absolutists (whom Bachman unhelpfully
calls relativists) do indeed, as Bachman writes, undermine "the virtues of democratic pluralism" and
threaten "a return to the tyranny of the majority."
One of the central arguments of my The Naked Public Square, which Bachman cites, is precisely the danger
posed by this privatization of moral discourse. I contend there and elsewhere that questions of great moral
moment should not be decided by the counting of
noses but by the weighing of arguments. If Bachman
thinks we disagree on that, he has seriously misunderstood my argument. Of course in democratic decision-making with respect to policy, it does at some
point come down to counting the noses of those per8

suaded by the arguments. Democracy is a very messy
and inelegant process, and the danger of raw
majoritarianism is very real.
In the case of abortion, however, I think the alternative danger of elite hostility to democratic discourse
and decision is more real and, in fact, has temporarily
triumphed. (I mean by "elite" what some have termed
the new knowledge class, as embodied in, for example,
the judiciary, the prestige media, and dominant institutions of higher education. Survey research over
the years is fairly consistent in indicating that about 20
per cent of the population would outlaw all abortions,
somewhat under 20 per cent favors the policy now established by Roe v. Wade, and the rest believe the unborn should be legally protected, with abortion allowed in relatively rare "extreme cases.")
With Bachman, I insist that arguments for public
policy should be genuinely public arguments. But arguments do from time to time issue in policy decisions
which, if they are to be democratically legitimate, must
be supported by a widespread sentiment that is not to
be confused with a "tyranny" of the majority. And
this, of course, is true of all law, not simply law relative to abortion.
I have suggested, then, that Bachman's "absolutist"
is in fact a publicly engaged moral philosopher and his
"relativist" is in fact an absolutist who makes public
moral discourse very difficult. I pass over his third category, that of the "reductionist," since it seems to me
an essentially accurate description of one kind of actor
in the current debate. However, his preferred category
of the "skeptic" is, I am afraid, not very helpful either.
It turns out that his skeptic is not very skeptical at all.
His skeptic in fact knows a great deal about the truth.
Consider, for example, Bachman's proposal for recasting the abortion debate in terms of risks. What, he
asks, are the consequences if public policy is based on
the hypothesis that abortion is wrong or on the
hypothesis that abortion is not wrong? If abortion is
not wrong but is prohibited, there is a serious infringement of freedom and attendant individual suffering.
If abortion is wrong but permitted, millions of innocent human beings are slaughtered. As indicated by
his parenthetical remark mentioned earlier, the unskeptical Pr. Bachman knows perfectly well that it is
wrong to slaughter innocent human beings.
Bachman's proposal for recasting the abortion debate in terms of risk is also ingenuous (not, please
note, disingenuous). For two decades innumerable
prolife advocates have been urging their opponents to
entertain the "what if' question. For the sake of argument, what might be called a postulate of ignorance is
routinely stipulated with respect to whether the unborn are human beings with a claim upon societal proThe Cresset

tection. The prochoice advocates just as routinely refuse to take the bait. Knowing full well that the calculus of consequences is devastating to their position,
they, as Bachman notes at one point, promptly and
understandably change the subject. The unskeptical
Pr. Bachman knows that this is an evasion of truth and
consequences.
I also have no doubt that he knows that the abortion
debate is not only about the moral status of the unborn but drives to the heart of what we mean by political and moral community. The question posed is:
Who belongs to the community for which we accept
common responsibility and provide legal protection?
The inevitable next question is: By what criteria do we
exclude one class of what is undeniably human life, in
this case the unborn, without by the same criteria
excluding others whom we do not intend to exclude?

Some people, accepting Bachman's
invitation to calculate the
comparative risks, will think it

what people should do about it. Also, the call to
"fiercely" oppose those who would crusade sounds
very much like a call to crusade. But if by "crusade"
he means impassioned warfare unchecked by reason
and civility, then by all means let us not have a
crusade. On the other hand, as Bachman seems not to
appreciate, democracy is frequently a raucous project.
Some people, accepting Bachman's invitation to calculate the comparative risks, will think it morally intolable that it may be that in the United States of
America approximately four thousand babies are killed each day. Others, on the basis of reasoning that is
genuinely public in nature, have concluded that there
is no "may be" about it. In either case, these people
are likely to get a good deal more worked up about the
situation than Pr. Bachman appears to be. Many of
them may determine to try and do something about it.
Pr. Bachman might call it a crusade. But it is simply
the way that people in a democratic society attempt to,
in his words, "return careful, public reasoning to the
public sphere, even and precisely where disagreement
persists."
C:

morally intolerable that it may be
that in the United States of America
approximately four thousand babies
are killed each day.

Pr. Bachman does himself a disservice. By insisting
upon the truths at stake in the abortion debate, he discloses that he is no skeptic at all. What he unfortunately calls skepticism, it seems to me, is a measure of
modesty about what we can claim to know for sure
and a devotion to civil discourse in the public square.
As attractive as they may initially appear to be, three
of Bachman's four categories do not stand up under
closer examination. His "absolutist" is a publicly engaged moral philosopher, his "relativist" is an absolutist who is indifferent to the protocols of public
discourse, and his "skeptic" is an intelligently modest
practitioner of civic virtue. However, were it simply a
matter of addressing conceptual confusions or of correcting Pr. Bachman's misunderstanding of my position, his essay would not warrant this extended response. But the essay may have the unfortunate consequence of throwing cold water on vigorous engagement in the abortion debate.
Bachman's conclusion is that people "should join the
skeptic in arguing that there is genuine truth and in
fiercely opposing those who seek to crusade in its
name." Bachman is very unskeptical in knowing that
there is genuine truth and in knowing the truth about
September, 1987

Iberia
At the parking lot flea market, I bought
a black-velvet banner like the one my aunt
hung over her fireplace when I was a kid
who believed that all things Spanish
meant Spain. She would turn on the lamp
which spun to look like flames, then light
pine incense, safer than sparks and ashes
she would always say, and dream about
her grandmother's woodburning stove.
The matador twirled the cape, daring
the hull's heaving shoulders which shrugged off
the death he could smell in paint chips.
The tapestry became my travel poster, dispenser
of Mediterranean truths, as I planned
my escape. After high school, at a World 's Fair
fiesta in Coney Island, I ate chicken tacos
for the first time, gawked green-eyed
at the jet braids of Chicanas who trilled
their r's like castanets, thinking I could
still practice Castilian, lisping a seabreeze
in a Valencia orange grove.

Martha M. Vertreace
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Renu Juneja

GROUNDS WE STAND ON
Varieties of Exile & the West Indian Experience

There is a story about an Arab (or an Indian or an
African) that reappears with a changing cast over different parts of the world. I originally heard it in
India; more recently, I heard it again in Trinidad ; and
it may be significant that I have never heard it in the
West. An Arab and, shall we say, an Indian are travelling together through Arabia. They are moving away
from a town when the Indian is surprised to see his
companion repeatedly stop and look over his shoulder
towards the town they have just left behind. Finally,
after the tenth such incident, the Indian asks the
Arab: "Nasser, what are you doing? What are you
looking for? " And Nasser, unperturbed, responds:
"I'm waiting for my soul to catch up with me. "
The story is sufficiently enigmatic to have many
meanings. Essentially about self-division, it refers to a
kind of sensation familiar enough for those who are
not at home for whatever reason-a discomforting
sense of disjunction between the space inhabited by
the body and by the soul. We are not fully present to
the present place or time because part of us is still
somewhere else.
Such feelings are characteristic of experiences of
homelessness and exile, and common enough in
human history whenever people have left home struck
by wanderlusts or driven from a life no longer acceptable. In a primary myth of Western civilization, Adam
and Eve find themselves dispossessed of that magically
nurturing environment we term home; they must wander, as must their descendents, in a state of perpetual
exile. The condition, indeed, has been regarded as so
universal that philosophers like Sartre and Camus

Renu Juneja has recently returned to the Department of
English at Valparaiso University from a sabbatical leave in
the British West Indies. She is a frequent contributor to The
Cresset. H er most recent essay, "Of Sabbaticals, Work, and
Time: R eflections on Cultural Marginality," appeared last
February.
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have constructed a paradigm of human existence
through metaphors of exile.
Of the dangers of asserting cross-cultural universality we are now fully aware through the recent formulations of cultural anthropology. No aspect of human
existence appears in timeless isolation. No event is free
of wider political realities and no behavior innocent of
the larger cultural context. So, too, the cross-cultural
experience of exile should not obscure that these experiences express very different social and moral
realities. The causes, the effects, the preceding and resultant attitudes to exile transform the reality of this
apparently universal experience.
Let us take some specific instances of exile. For the
Jews during their Babylonian exile, the pain and grief
of dispossession is made bearable by two factors: what
has happened is not altogether inexplicable and need
not, will not, be final. If Yahweh's anger has caused
their being driven away from home, then it is also an
anger which has been merited. God's will has caused
the exile and in God also lies the hope. God willwhen human suffering is sufficient, repentance sincere, divine anger diminished-lead the people back
home. Such is the understanding promoted by the
prophetic writings of Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Isaiah,
and such the belief which sustained Jews through centuries of diaspora-a view of history that now promotes what some perceive as a somewhat excessive devotion to the notion of Israel as a divinely-sanctioned
homeland. One of the supreme ironies of our century
must be that the exiled, wandering Jew, almost
paradigmatically homeless, should now render the
Palestinian Arabs homeless.
With some other religious exiles, however, this
search for home has been a very different experience
with different consequences. Most notably, the many
sects of Protestant refugees fleeing Europe for the
New World were not only leaving home, they were
also going home. Perhaps for this too there is a parallel within the paradigmatic Jewish experience. During
Exodus, when the Jews were both driven from and
The Cresset

chose to leave Egypt, for many this separation must
have felt like leaving an accustomed if confining
home. But even as the Jews were driven from Egypt
they were drawn to Canaan. So, too, were the Puritans
both driven from England and drawn to the Americas
by the promise of religious freedom, a journey that
the Puritan poet Andrew Marvell envisions as almost
a return to the lost Edenic home:
Where the remote Bermudas ride
In the ocean's bosom unespied,
From a small boat, that row'd along,
The listening winds received this song.
What should we do but sing his praise
That led us through the watery maze,
Unto an isle so long unknown,
And yet far kinder than our own? .
He gave us this eternal spring,
Which here enamels everything
And sends the fowls to us in care .
He makes the figs our mouths to eat
And throws the melons at our feet ..
"Bermudas"'

The New World is now too well populated and too
well sustained by a manifest cultural system to appear
the Eden we can shape to our dream. Unlike the
seventeenth-century immigrants, modern immigrants
to America must seek to adapt to, fit into, an existing
society. But like the Puritans, the twentieth-century
immigrants have chosen to leave their home, although
now the motivations are overwhelmingly economic. In
such an exile there is little discontent. These people
now are where they want to be.
Their worlds of memory and dream may remain
haunted by a landscape left behind, but their conscious and public pronouncements are usually filled
with almost cloying gratitude for being here-a profession of gratitude that the society they have joined expects and even demands. Many, of course, remain,
mentally if not physically, holders of dual passports.
Some are even vaguely self-divided. Nonetheless, all
make a willing and determined effort to assimilate by
acquiring the language, mannerisms, modes of behavior, attitudes, and values of their new home.
In contrast, one of the most shattering varieties of
homelessness must be the one induced by colonialism,
a condition which is not only a geographical fact but
also a state of mind. Without adequate recorded testimony, estimates of the effects of the Roman Empire
or Greek slavery must remain at the level of inference
and extrapolation. With the more recent instances of
European colonialism the consequences are easier to
'Andrew Marvell, Complete Poetry (New York: Random
House, 1968).
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analyze because, in some measure, they are still with
us.
First, there was the spiritual dispossession of those
who continued to live in the territory they regarded as
home. For the people of Asia and Africa, for instance,
this possession by a race and civilization so alien from
their own induced a kind of schizophrenia among
those brought into contact with the imperial race. At
the most extreme ends of the spectrum, as for instance
in island societies where the smallness of the territory
made reservation culture impossible, we note the
tragic consequences of this spiritual dispossession-the
near extinction of the Arawaks in the West Indies and
the total extinction of the Tasmanians in the Pacific.

One of the most shattering varieties
of homelessness must be the one
induced by colonialism, a condition
which is not only a geographical
fact but also a state of mind.
In his recent book, Victorian Anthropology, George
Stocking, Jr. describes the history of the Tasmanians.
The final phase of the colonizer's dealings with the
Tasmanians (after the killing and the raping) was an
effort to civilize them through the force of the Protestant ethic. The reports of the first Christian missionary
claimed that the work of Christianizing and civilizing
was succeeding. "Instead of 'wandering about the settlement with listless and careless indifference,' the Tasmanians were now wholly employed in useful labor,
harmless amusements, religious exercises, and attendance at school ... those who could afford them now
ate with knives and forks." As Stocking writes, there
was "one 'serious drawback to the success of the establishment.' Though 'every advantage of civilized life'
had been afforded them, the Tasmanians persisted in
dropping off like flies." 2 Within a single generation
they were extinct.
In larger territories, the effects were, perhaps, not
so extreme. Life in the remote villages of India or Africa may have continued virtually unaltered, except for
certain economic and political consequences often only
dimly comprehended. The urban, middle-class elite,
however, were forced to acquire an alien language and
through it the values of the culture of which the language was a product. The process of disorientation
was, as we have seen with the Tasmanians, not merely
an unplanned by-product of interaction. The Empires
2

George Stocking, Jr., Victorian Anthropology (New York:
Free Press, 1987).
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also had a manifest agenda of forcing the colonized
out of their cultural perceptions of reality into their
master's definitions of reality.
And they largely succeeded. The differences with
the Jewish exile are instructive. Even in their ghetto
existence, the Jews never lost their identify as Jews, or
their sense of self-worth supported by their firm belief
in themselves as God's chosen people. Perhaps since
the efforts at conversion came from a people not radically different in cultural values and schemes of reality, the Jews were more successful in withstanding
such pressures. In contrast, when the British left India
and Africa, they also left behind a whole class of
"brown Sahibs" (as they are called in India) and AfroSaxons, a class which also inherited the power of the
rulers.
Movements to win independence, by inculcating national pride, did ameliorate this spiritual dispossession
among the educated, but the sense of inferiority internalized during colonial rule cannot be easily removed.
Even when the infection is not so extreme, these are

in the wet autumn
the lake fogs over in the wet autumn
and the blue boats bump against the dock
lost in the fine rain that spills
out of the grey clouds
in the cafe the counter man wipes
the cups and tells the couple
from Dubuque about the crowd
that used to meet here
in the 40's
a light comes on in the house
on the hill
she parts the heavy curtains
and watches the boats bump
against the dock
and thinks of lighting a cigaret
the rain drenches the tall eucalyptus trees
beside the cafe across the water
and the blue boats fade
in the gloom
and go out

J. T. Ledbetter

people who have been acculturated into accepting
Western notions of progress and Western models of
development. The masters may have left, but their institutions survive to affect political, civil, and even the
inner life of the former colonies.
For the victims of slavery and indentured labor, the
exile was both physical and spiritual. Since the slaves
were captured from different tribes and language
groups along the West African coast, they found it
very difficult to retain a sense of identity gathered
through group memory of history and tradition. The
African slave, unlike the Jew, was deprived both of the
past and the future. In also being deprived of language, the slave was subjected to that total exile where
the spirit is as homeless as the body. Imprisoned in an
alien cultural system, the slaves lacked the binding
force of mythology that lives through language and
group memory and that, as Yeats says, marries us to
rock and hill, making that particular ground our
home.
Given the extremity of deprivation, it may be pointless to distinguish between better and worse kinds of
slavery. But if such distinctions were to be made, one
could argue that the West Indian experience of slavery
was worse than the North American for several
reasons.
The white plantocracy of the islands continued for
generations to view their stay in the islands as a temporary exile. The sugar plantations for which the
slaves were imported remained merely a source of income which made gentlemanly living possible, once
profits were gathered, back home in England. This
New World, then, was never the Edenic haven of freedom for any group within its society, never a home
away from home from the fetters of Egypt or Babylon.
Within the islands, the Edenic metaphor only merits
an ironic treatment, as, for instance, in Derek Walcott's poem "New World." 3
So when Adam was exiled
to our New Eden, in the ark's gut,
the coined snake coiled there for good
fellowship also; that was willed.
Adam had an idea.
He and the snake would share
the loss of Eden for profit
So both made the New World. And it looked good.

Even when for most plantation owners absenteeism
was no longer possible, when for most in reality the islands were home and England merely a temporary
sojourn, the tradition of what has been called
3
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All citations from Walcott's poems are from Collected Poems
1948-1984 (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986).
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psychological absenteeism continued. Those who could
afford it sent their children to England for education.
In 1774, Edward Long, in his History of Jamaica,
lamented that those who return "regret their exile
from the gay delights of London," and have "a riveted
prejudice against colony life." "For the White Creoles,"
writes Kenneth Ramchand (The West Indian Novel and
Its Background), "England was home, the West Indies
was never the loved place. "4 The situation is not very
different even after independence. With the recent
overthrow of the party in power since independence,
the former President of Trinidad and Tobago has retired to England, where, presumably, he feels more at
home.

For the Black Rastafarians, the
multi-racial Jamaica, where the
economic and political power still
resides with the colored elite, is
Babylon, the place of unhappy exile.
Ethiopia is the promised land.
The gravest consequence of such attitudes was what
Ramchand has termed "cultural absenteeism." In refusing to regard the islands as home, the White
Creoles failed to build a society with vital, living traditions and cultural forms. At best, what was available
was the worst kind of cultural conservatism-the lifeless conservation of the European heritage. The appropriate image would be of a child spiritlessly tapping the keys of a piano, never fully involved in or responsive to the music, neither taking it in or giving
anything back.
The Caribbean slaves, then, were forced to exist in
this vast vacuum. Circumstances of slavery denied the
slaves much access to their own past, their history,
their culture which could sustain them in exile, and
through which they could build themselves a home
away from home. Since the white rulers practiced a
deliberate policy of breaking up family units, the
slaves were even denied the elemental bonding between husband, wife, parents, children, siblings which
could sustain a sense of belonging. The extremity of
their condition was, as we may surmise, further
exacerbated by living within a culture that failed to
root and grow (and which, despite its sovereign position, remained a minority culture in population size)
•Edward Long, History of Jamaica (London: 1774), Vol. 2,
p. 248; and Kenneth Ramchand, The West Indian Novel
and Its Background (London: Faber, 1970), p. 35.
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in its self-imposed spiritual exile. When the massa was
not home, the slave too remained homeless.
Let us turn, once again, to the Jewish experience in
exile, to one of the most poignant descriptions of this
experience in Psalm 137:
By the waters of Babylon,
there we sat down and wept,
when we remembered Zion.
On the willows there
We hung our lyres

Without any changes, this could be sung by the
"dreadlocked" Rastafarians of Jamaica, a Black religious cult which began in the 1930s, taking its cue from
Marcus Garvey's impassioned statement that the Negroes would now view God through their own spectacles, a black God instead of a white one. "We Negroes
believe in the God of Ethiopia, the everlasting GodGod the Son, God the Holy Ghost, the one God of all
ages. That is the God in whom we believe, but we shall
worship him through the spectacles of Ethiopia." 5
The crowning of Ras Tafari in 1930, the great
grandson of King Saheka Selassie, as i:he King of
Ethiopia with the titles of Haile Selassie (Might of the
Trinity), and the "Lion of the Tribe of Judah," provided the mythology for the Rastafarians. For the
Black Rastafarians, the multi-racial Jamaica, where the
economic and political power still resides with the colored elite, is Babylon, the place of unhappy exile.
Ethiopia is the promised land, the Zion, with Haile
Selassie as the King who would arise from Jesse's root
to liberate the people. The mythology has adapted to
the overthrow and death of Haile Selassie without any
loss of faith in Ethiopia as a spiritual home to which
the Rastas await return.
Yet whereas the Jews sang about what may be
termed empirical history, the Rastafarians have manufactured a history, whose spiritual validity one cannot, of course, deny. The slaves did not come from
Ethiopia, and return to Africa, even on the limited
scale on which it has been attempted, seems impossible. Since the Jews have participated in a continuous
history, they may go back to a home which lies in their
past. Denied such history, and completely dislocated
from the original society of which they are now an altered fragment, the descendents of African slaves
must remain in exile.
Or more profitably, begin building a new home and
a new society. The Trench Town Report, a survey of
Rastafarians taken by the Jamaican government in
1967, revealed that the majority of household heads
5

A. J. Garvey, Philosophy and Opinions, 2nd ed. (London:
Frank Class & Co., 1967), p. 34.
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interviewed wished to remain in the area. 6 This ambivalence of attitudes is predictable. These are people
who are not at home in their present society, but who
do not really have a home to which they can return.
Like Nasser in the story, they must wait, in this case
for their deprived body to catch up with their freer
soul.
The Caribbean islands are manufactured societies
whose artificiality has delayed the process of an imported people taking root in the portion of earth that
is now their home. This unrootedness is characteristic
even of those sections of the population that were allowed to retain their history and their traditions. The
East Indians, for instance, came to the West Indies as
indentured labor to fill the vacuum of cheap, surplus
labor for sugar plantations after emancipation had
freed the slaves from a hated life they now, understandably, sought to avoid. The Indians were encouraged to live in isolated enclaves, and so were able to
maintain a coherent tradition, even retain the language for the first two generations. Although the
dream of repatriation faded, India remained a
spiritual home.
But the passage of time forces an inevitable divorce.
In significant irony, the most visible and audible signs
of Indian heritage in Trinidad today are cinema
billboards of vulgar, commercial films from Bombay
and the blaring of movie songs from loudspeakers
mounted on vans advertising these movies-songs
sung in a language that most East Indian Trinidadians
no longer understand. The pathos of this situation 1s
captured by Walcott in his poem "Exile."
When the God stamps his bells
and smoke writhes its blue arms for your lost India
the old men, threshing rice, rheum-eyed, pause
their loss chafed by the raw
whine of the cinema-van calling the countryside
to it dark devotions. . . . The hymn
to Mother India whore's a lie.

To dream of a home you cannot return to makes
you a perpetual exile. In any case, for a substantial
number of the population, those of mixed ancestry,
even these dreams are not possible. As the calypsonian
Mighty Dougla (dougla is Trinidadese for an Afro-Indian) sang wittily many years ago: "If they serious
about sending people back in true/ They going to have
to split me in two."
For sections of the post-colonial population for
whom English, by whatever circumstances, has become
the first and not the second language, the notion of
•See Rex Nettleford's chapter on Rastafarians in Mirror
Mirror Uamaica: William Collins & Sangster, 1970).
14

home remains a perplexing one. The language in
which they dream embodies a landscape, an environment, a set of experiences very different from the
landscape, the environment, and the experiences about
which they dream. Even the most successful manipulators of these conflicting realities are not free from
confusions about home and, more importantly, those
essentials of our consciousness secured by our sense of
home--our sense of identity, of who we are and what
we are.

West Indian writers are culturally
worse off than Black writers in
America, who can annex themselves to
a creative tradition even if the
tradition has little to do with the
challenges of being black in America.
In the British West Indies, for instance, English is
the only language, although some distinctions may be
made between standard English, standard West-Indian
English, and creole dialects. The peculiar colonial situation had thoroughly institutionalized the notion of
England as home. Among the educated white and colored population, as we have seen, no indigenous tradition of literature developed. Hence the West Indian
writers (much like their counterparts in the musical
arts of the calypso, the reggae, and the steelband) are
in the process of creating, not sustaining, a tradition.
In a sense, then, the West Indian writers are culturally far worse off than the Black writers in America
who can annex themselves to a creative tradition, even
if the tradition has little to do with the problems and
challenges of being black in America. They can use
that tradition to record their variant understanding of
being American because, literally, they are at home in
that tradition. Through language and education, the
West-Indian writers belong to the English tradition,
yet they are not at home in England-both because
their home has been the islands and because they are
not fully a part of the cultural system whose forms
they learned by rote, a kind of book knowledge that
can fail them at any time. Hence, for them, the situation seems more schizoid, subject to the kind of self-division that haunts Walcott in an early poem:
I who am poisoned with the blood of both
Where shall I turn, divided in vein?
I who have cursed
The drunken officer of British rule, how choose
Between the African and English tongue I love?
"A Far Cry from Africa"
The Cresset

The West-Indian writers, then, have until recently
been in a spiritual if not physical exile. Most of them
left the islands for England sometime in their careers,
and many still reside away from the islands. (Canada
and America, by virtue of a shared language, have attracted some away from England.) Partly the reasons
are economic. The economic dependence of the West
Indies predicates that all books must first be published
abroad. One of the consequences of the colonial situation has been a lack of audience for the writers in the
islands, where, because of a lack of education, cultivation, and economic resources philistine attitudes
tended to prevail.
As Derek Walcott writes, "It is almost death to the
spirit to try to survive as an artist under colonial rule,
which hasn't really changed with our independent governments."7 The writers are not only driven from the
islands by such a situation, they are also drawn to England. Walcott, again, describes the experience:
the gulls who peck
waste from the ploughed channel
knew that you had not come home
to England; you were home.
Even her wretched weather
was poetry. Your scarred leather
held that first
indenture, to her Word .. .
"Exile"

But very quickly comes the awareness that here, too,
you are a stranger, shut out from the inner life of the
people: "But the train/ soon changed its poetry to the
prose/ of narrowing pinched eyes you could not
enter." And the writer returns in memory to the home
he has left behind: "an ochre trace of flags and carat
huts opens at Chapter one . . . invisibly your ink
nourishes/ leaf after leaf the furrowed villages"
("Exile"). Walcott's testimony is not unique. "This island is my shadow," writes Sam Selvon. He will take
it wherever he goes. 8
The act of returning home in memory affirms and
validates part of one's identity that cannot be ignored
whatever the distance travelled from that original self.
Our earliest cultural preconceptions remain, for most
of us, the grounds of our being. We may learn to be
at home wherever we are if we can learn to be at
home with these vestigial parts of ourselves. The West
Indians, then, in struggling to define a home are also
struggling to define an identity, as much, perhaps, as
they are trying to gather an identity from their frag7Walcott, "Meanings," Savacou, no. 2 (1970), p. 45.
8 Sam Selvon, "Three Into One Can't Go," Wasafiri, Caribbean focus issue, p. 11.
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mented, deprived past.
Predictably, the West Indian artists are often preoccupied with questions of identity. Vidia Naipaul's later
fiction is obsessed with the inability of his characters to
find an authentic self. His scathing depiction of West
Indians as The Mimic Men (1967) is a despairing confrontation of the cultural marginality to which the
Caribbean (and much of the colonial world) has been
reduced. Lovelace and Selvon are more generous in
allowing their characters to gather the self-assurance
which arises from coming to terms with the past and
the present, from being, finally, at home with oneself.
At the level of folk art, too, the calypsonians and
steelbands are asserting that a vital culture can be born
from deprivation. "Out of pain," sings the calypsonian
David Rudder, "our culture was born." As he sings
this tribute to the panmaker (the steelbandsman), he
testifies as well to that hunger for home and identity
that propels the West Indian artist into art: "And from
that hunger came a feeling ... that shaped the steel."
The West Indian artist's self-situating response to
forces of history and the dominant culture also illustrates the potential of an individual consciousness to
free itself of a given hegemony. Humans are, after all,
actors in their history and society. If, as Edward Said
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has convincingly argued, culture is a "possessing possession" with demonstrable powers to dominate, then
a willed homelessness may even be necessary to free
oneself of this "possession"-to allow our consciousness to admit the Others, those alterities, that this culture has so strenuously kept out. 9 I think now of
Michael Foucault's vision of classical European culture
as an institutionalized attempt to exclude what it
deems insane.
Finally, let me turn to an example that Said, a Palestinian exile, offers of a Jewish exile from Nazi Europe-Erich Auerbach's writing of Mimesis in Istanbul.
Said refers to Auerbach's apologia in the epilogue: "it
is quite possible that the book owes its existence to .. .
lack of a rich and specialized library. If it had been
possible for me to acquaint myself with all the work
that has been done on so many subjects, I might never
have reached the point of writing."
Said probes beneath this drama of modesty to uncover the pain of exile, but also the victory over the
dangers of exile-not writing would have meant, as
Said comments, succumbing to the "Joss of texts, traditions, and continuities that make up the very web of
culture." But while this writing about the culture from
which he is exiled staves off the possibility of becoming decultured, such a monumental undertaking as
Auerbach's ("the representation of reality in Western
Literature") is only possible because of this distance
from home (away from the weight of the tradition
represented in libraries.)
Said glosses his argument by referring us to Auerbach's essay, "Philologie der W eltliteratur." Here Auerbach asserts the need to gain distance from one's own
culture: "The most priceless and indispensable part of
a philologist's heritage is still his own nation's culture
and heritage. Only when he is first separated from his
heritage, however, and then transcends it does it become truly effective." Auerbach cites Hugo of St. Victor to emphasize this need to separate oneself from
home: "The man who finds his homeland sweet is still
a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom
the entire world is a foreign land ."
Exile is not a threat if, like Auerbach , we can use the
past. When the past is within reach, then whoever we
are wherever we are, we can come home to the present. Exile is an advantage when it liberates us from the
stronghold of our natal culture, freeing us spiritually
and intellectually. Or, to shift the metaphor, when it
provides the distance which makes genuine critical in••
quiry possible.

Living on Hardscrabble
Because coyotes are lean, we own them,
beggars that prowl parched fields
at midnight. At noon, if we stand
too long in one place, our bootsoles burn.
Only twice in my life such a drought,
the last one years ago, before Saigon.
Our crop that year was buzzards,
like watermelon vines black
after a frost. Now, Saigon blooms
often in my dreams, rockets,
monsoons too deep to wade, except awake.
I stare at skies too peaceful to believe.
I've told you all I saw, black words
like hawks gliding on thermals.
A man riding hardscrabble alone
carries his rifle for rattlers. Killing's
always in season, time enough for scruples
back at the barn, skinning a deer
that would have died hereafter.
Our children sleep with only me
to protect them, nothing I haven't
saved them from for years. Coyotes
fearing all evil on horseback
come out at night, feeding on fawns.
We dump all bales we can in dry pastures.
And still they starve, deer stumbling
down deep arroyos a hundred yards
from the barn. Wherever deer go,
coyotes are sure to follow,
tuck their tails and slink to the dump
where we save skinned bones for burning.
Mending the barbed-wire fence, we wonder
how many days until thunder, how many
steers we should auction, how many
coyotes fear guns if they're starving.

Walter McDonald

••

•Edward Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1983), p. 9.
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Heroes
James Combs
No man is a hero to his dog. My
little dog Linus, asleep under the
desk as I write this, is proof of that.
My pursuit of academic heroism, in
the form of massive tomes and
mighty books, impresses him not.
Accomplished con artist that he is,
any
celebratory
occasion
of
academic achievement is a bore unless there's something in it for him.
Often, as I bend over quaint and
curious volumes of forgotten lore,
he will give me his why-are-humans-so-stupid look, as if to say,
"Scribble, scribble, scribble, Mr.
Combs? Another book, Mr. Combs?"
It is humbling to be around a being
so totally unimpressed with human
conceits.
Like most dogs, Linus hangs
around because he knows a soft
touch when he sees one, and is
amused by these curious and pretentious beings who seem to need
so many superfluous and ephemeral things, like heroism. I wonder
what Ollie North's dog thinks of
him?
The estimable Lt. Col. North revived interest in heroes in the summer of 1987. Was he a "national
hero" or not? Polls and TV discussions about him seemed to indicate

James Combs is Professor of Political
Science at Valparaiso University and a
regular contributor to The Cresset.
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that the country was split, indeed
polarized: for some he was a bona
fide patriot victimized both by his
superiors, who saw him as a convenient fall guy, and by members of
Congress, with their dreary procedural objections to the adventures of the hero. For others, he
was a liar and a lunatic, the hero of
the shredding machine, the secret
bank account, and contra killing
fields, self-wrapped in his own patriotic last refuge, and protected by
a Constitution and institutional system for which he had nothing but
contempt.
I cannot recall a popular political
figure since Senator Joe McCarthy
that so divided opinion. Senator
Paul Simon took the negative, saying tht "no one deserves the hero
rank who admits that he lied, he
cheated, he shredded evidence, and
he violated the laws of our nation
he swore to uphold," and drew
both boos and applause. Many
others took the positive, and there
was an "Ollie for President" boomlet. Some could envision him as the
kind of presidential hero we need,
and others could see his election,
should it occur, as proof of the deterioration of the Republic into
Caesarism and reason to seek refuge from political madness m
Canada.
Both fantasies, I suspect, reflect
another great American ambivalence, on the one hand the desire
for heroes and on the other the
fear of heroes. Heroes throughout
history have often been "eventmaking" people, mobilizing forces
that effect great changes. But they
are also dangerous, often leaving
trails of fanaticism and blood and
residues of skepticism about their
utility. "Happy the land," despaired
Bertold Brecht of the first half of
the twentieth century, "that needs
no heroes."
There is something apocalyptic
about heroes. Those who like them
and want them see them resolving

history, triumphing over inertia
and compromise, at last emerging
victorious over villains and fools.
Those who fear them may want
justice done, but not at the price of
the heavens falling. President
North might redeem the future for
a sunlit American summer or for a
dark global winter of war and
death.

The estimable Lt. Col.
North revived interest
in heroes in the summer
of 1987. Was he a
"national hero" or not?
Or, more likely, he would find it
impossible to do either. Heroes
don't remain heroes very long if
they can't bring off some prodigious resolution to things-unless
(and perhaps this was one of the
keys to Olliemania) their heroism
was somehow thwarted, betrayed,
prevented by the petty and smallminded or even sinister forces
from the triumph of their will.
North has a career ahead of him
on the right-wing lecture circuit,
forever ennobled and celebrated as
the superman who, if given the opportunity, could have defeated the
Sandinistas, overthrown the Iranian
revolutionaries, and shot down Abu
Nidal (recall that General Patton,
one of North's spiritual ancestors,
challenged General Rommel to a
single combat tank duel, Patton in
a Pershing and Rommel in a Panzer, to decide the outcome of
World War II). The best way to
keep a heroic reputation intact is
never having to prove it.
So those who say that Col. North
is a figure from the realm of myth
and fairy tale are quite right. The
heroic tradition does indeed include a thousand faces, archetypical
figures that act out paradigms of
heroism in ritual universes. And no
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one is totally immune. Most of us
in youth elevated athletes or movie
stars to the status of gods. Perhaps
we all have our own pantheons.
And it is easy to see why on reflection. We are all trapped in our own
existential ordinariness, in the daily
round of frustration and humiliation, often defeated by recalcitrant
reality.
The hero is above the mundane,
defeats existence through his or
her extraordinariness, is immune
from doubt and compromise and
failure, overcomes limits and rules
through audacity and daring. The
hero affirms for us some measure
of human control over time and
space, gives us the sense that at
least for a moment in the sun, life
can triumph over death, or at least
death can be defied. We can all
imagine ourselves in ideal universes
performing heroic deeds. I myself
have hit more home runs than
Ruth and Aaron, hit for higher average than Williams and Boggs,
fanned more batters than Feller
and Ryan.
For these reasons, then, it is easy
to see how Col. North could become an "alter ego" for old men
like Casey and Reagan. They were
bound by rules and procedure and
"oversight"; Ollie could float above
bureaucracies and committees, defy
rules, come up with "neat" and outrageous ideas, risk death or capture
in the palace of the Kingdom of
Darkness. Perhaps he appealed to
Reagan's private fantasies derived
from his movie days of playing
"Brass Bancroft of the Secret Service ; certainly he could bestir
Casey's memories of derring-do in
the OSS.
But the importance of North's
heroic audacity became really significant when he went public, that
is, when he became a massmediated personage, a face on Tshirts, a haircut craze, an object of
adoration and veneration. However
contrived (and he did have a con18

sultant who advised him on how to
look and what "themes" to develop
in his appearance on TV), his selfproclamation was more "testimonial" than testimony, and appealed
to more than it repulsed. Joe
McCarthy had been destroyed by
appearing as the bully on TV,
proving that television could be a
politically
subversive
medium;
North proved that TV could be a
politically superversive medium if
one's performance hit the right
public chords.

The hero is above the
mundane, defeats
existence through his or
her extraordinariness,
is immune from doubt,
compromise, and failure.
North's television coup d'etat we
might term performance as propaganda, making a heroic statement
about what he, and by extension
the country, should stand for and
do, and the hell with the fickle and
vacillating. Ollie strode boldly
through the front door of the Congress and defiantly told them, and
us, that heroes act and that the nitpickers merely impede the hero
from the completion of his quest.
In a bad year for Marines, what
with the Moscow embassy scandal
and Stanley Kubrick's savage movie
portrayal of Marine boot camp and
Vietnam combat, North conjured
up heroic memories.
He was Clint Eastwood m
Heartbreak Ridge, John Wayne in
Sands of lwo Jima, Jack Webb in The
D.l. He was clear-eyed, aggressive,
and single-minded in the halls of
the bleary-eyed, timid, and fuzzyminded. He was a master of singlethink and straight talk in the
citadel of doublethink and doubletalk. He was an heroic individual
defying and even lecturing a de-

cidedly unheroic institution, a body
at worst obstructive and at best
irrelevant to his unrepentant
heroism.
A lot of us loved it, and embraced him as an embodiment of
our collective alter egoes, what we
in our heart of hearts would love to
do--flaunt convention, act without
doubt, soar above the ordinary.
The mythic Ollie is like Peter Pan,
a child-king in a fairyland of
beauty and menace who lives an eternal adventure and who always
defeats the Captain Hooks of the
world. (Does this mean that Fawn
Hall is Tinker Bell?)
Such are the momentary satisfactions of television performance. It
was for many a performance to be
savored, and North a figure to be
treasured. But in the age of mass
media, the performance principle
may be good for one show and no
more.
In some ways, Oliver North is
similar to Charles Lindbergh. In a
celebrated article, John William
Ward suggested the meaning of
Lindbergh's flight. The flight came,
he says, "at the end of a decade
marked by social and political corruption and by a sense of moral
loss .... A philosophy of relativism
had become the uneasy rationale of
a nation which had formerly believed in moral absolutes. . . .
Lindbergh's chief worth was his
spiritual value." Lindbergh became
an instant mass-mediated hero because for his time he gave the
country "a glimpse of what they
liked to think themselves to be at a
time when they feared they had deserted their own vision of themselves."
Lindbergh was a more unwmmg
and reluctant hero than North, but
Ward's point is that Lindbergh flew
the Atlantic at precisely the right
moment.
Lindbergh
combined
something of the mythic past (the
lone individual doing something
heroic) and the mythic future
The Cresset

(doing something heroic with new
technology), giving the celebrating
public the sense that he represented the survival of something
valuable from the past useful for
progress into an uncertain future.
After that momentary celebration,
however, he had served his purpose, and even though a great future in politics or whatever was
predicted for him, he faded into
relative obscurity (save, of course,
for the kidnapping and murder of
his child and his involvement in the
America First movement, the latter
of which tarnished his heroic
image).
North emerged as a hero at a
moment of uncertainty somewhat
similar to 1927. Both national and
individual values and purpose
seemed a bit unraveled, and some
of the popular heroes of the ageLee Iacocca, Ivan Boesky, Jim and
Tammy Bakker, Gary Hart-in
moral eclipse. The ethos of the age
seemed to have deteriorated into
sheer opportunism, and a convicted
murderer and the head of a prostitution ring got their stories on the
national bestseller lists. TV news
paraded a steady stream of influence peddlers, inside traders, indicted public officials, and athletes
caught with drugs. The Governor
of Texas saw nothing wrong with
payoffs to football players at a
Methodist university.
Just before the emergence of
North 62 per cent of those interviewed in an ABC-Washington Post
poll said they thought things in the
United States "have gotten pretty
seriously off on the wrong track."
Like Lindbergh, North gave us a
heroic vision of what we should be
at a time when we were not at all
certain we ever would be.
Unlike Lindbergh, there was
much public division and ambivalence about North. For some,
North's attitude was part of what
was terribly wrong at the present;
for others, his attitude was what we
September, 1987

needed to put things right. The
Iran-contra committee itself debated the proposition that "the end
justifies the means." When Congressman Lee Hamilton chided
North that "his attitude didn't
square with the U.S. Constitution,"
North didn't seem to comprehend.
Those suspicious of such heroics
found that chilling.
Would Ollie shred the Constitution itself? Could he not imagine
any moral or political constraints
on secret wars, unknown deals, and
unaccountable funds? Did he condone an American state run by a

shadow government, with secret
ideas about imposing martial law?
Was he willing to burn the American village in order to save it?
Such nagging questions took a bit
of the bloom off the Ollie rose, and
the Republic seems destined to survive the little shaking that North
gave it. For as Linus says, quoting
Emerson (like George Apley, Linus
finds that Emerson always has
something capital to say about such
things), every hero becomes a bore
at last. North's volcanic heroism
will no doubt be cooled by success
on the banquet and book circuit.

The Red Toyota Truck Event
Amelia'd never studied mirrors much
or even her reflection when she passed
(at six-o-nine exactly, every morning,
rain or shine) the Paradise Cafe. But
yesterday's experience changed all that.
Striding out the valley at, predictably,
five-twenty-five, then over Widow Martin's
fields towards town to, as she likes to put it,
"Clear the head while Ledville sleeps,"
she sensed routine was to be somehow broken.
Sure enough. Where Main and Union intersected,
a red Toyota truck had stalled. Or waited.
Its driver, half-hung out the window, grinned
"Good mornin'" first, then "-darlin! " with
his lips pressed so (never say I told) "suggestively"
into a kiss, she never thought, well,
should she answer, but only reddened while he
whistled off with one well-muscled arm still
hanging out, saluting.
And so he doesn't know she
missed the curb and stumbled kind of blindly north
the wrong and, therefore, unrecorded way back home
to check-the first time ever so-her
entry, bedroom, bathroom, parlor mirrors.

Lois Reiner
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His zeal will be channelled into
speechifying, but one suspects no
future Administration will touch
him, and the Pentagon dislikes
such lone rangers. Running for
Congress would be tantamount to
joining the Iranian mullahs or
Ortega's Politburo. More importantly, by the end of 1988 Ollie will
be, as the kids say, history. He will
find the people more fickle and
vacillating than the Congress.

On television, the North
of now, spinning his own
telegenic heroism out of
video cloth, zealously
banters on, inviting
us to suspend belief.
In any case, the North phenomenon reminds us that there are
deeply rooted desires among at
least a segment of the American
populace for heroes. But TV
heroism like we saw with North is
a fleeting thing, something fanciful
and even a bit childish. In some
ways, it all can be viewed as a
harmless exercise in political immaturity.
But I think there is a larger
problem. With a few reservations, I
concur with the school of thought
in historical sociology that holds
that the world is being emptied of
authority. American Catholics ignore the traditional authority of
the Papacy; the Watergaters and
Irangaters defy the institutional authority of the Congress; after Hitler and Khomeni charismatic authority has been widely suspect. A
mass-mediated hero like Lindbergh
or North becomes a temporary substitute for our desire to believe in a
human power to triumph over
something.
But such figures emerge precisely because of our concurrent
desire to find authority and to dis-
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obey authority, to be both good
and free. The present finds us in a
mighty search for authority. Allan
Bloom seeks it in the classics;
evangelicals seek it in the Bible; authoritarians seek it in the State;
libertarians seek it in the Self. But
for our century authority has been
hard to sustain, largely because
people define freedom as the absence of authority. North seemed
oddly heroic because he combined
an unshakable belief in the authority of the Presidential state with his
freedom to act beyond the rule of
law or even the consent of his own
authority figures.
But the popular nerve that he
struck in the summer of 1987 revealed how much we want to believe in heroes, and how little we
actually believe in authorities.
North's attitude represented something of our own: he believed in
heroism, but seemed to have little
respect for authority, including his
superiors, whom he gladly implicated in wrongdoing. He may have
done a great deal for heroism, but
he didn't do much to increase
popular faith in public authority.
If it is the case that authority in
the world is being steadily eroded,
then we may see in the future the
quick rise and fall of heroic self-assertions, painless but stimulating
substitutes that author their own
performance but authorize nothing. This could mean a televised
political world that would be turbulent and even bizarre, but not very
stable. For if we are to witness a
world in which instituted authority
is the problem, and occasional
heroism the solution, then the
Norths of the future could wind up
being more than harmless summertime amusements.
On TV, the North of now, spinning his own telegenic heroism out
of video cloth, zealously banters on,
inviting us to suspend belief. Linus
snorts and goes back to sleep, unimpressed. Smart dog.
~~

Contemporary
Definitions
Gail McGrew Eifrig
As a public service, some 1987
updates to your lexicon:
civil disobedience
a refusal to obey laws which the
individual feels are unjust or bad
laws. For such a refusal the individual expects punishment, and is
willing to endure it for the sake of
pointing out the problems with the
law. Remember the old story about
Thoreau, in jail for not paying
what he thought was an unjust tax?
(Emerson : Henry, what are you
doing in there? Thoreau: Waldo,
what are you doing out there?)
This is of course an old story.
disinformation
telling people what you know is
not the truth, so that they will act
on the basis of your version of the
facts . This proceeding is apparently
so common in government that a
former student told me cheerfully
that his job in Washington was "disinformation-just for the summer."
deniability
a valuable feature of any ven-
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ture, endeavor, or enterprise that
the planner feels might turn out
badly, enabling the person responsible for the plan to say he didn't
know anything about it. "Deniability" has to be built in, or provided
for, and thus it is by definition an
indication of knowledge. If you
don't know about something, you
don't have a chance to plan for deniability. This may seem to be a
new term, until you remember
Eisenhower trying to work some
deniability into the Gary Francis
Powers case after the fact.
freedom, democracy, liberty, truth, justice, and the American way
a group of words with meanings
far too difficult and complex for
the ordinary American to worry
about. If somebody wearing medals
uses them, and says "sir," you can
just accept his definition.
hero
a sandwich

cymczsm
a condition of distrust about
most important things (authority,
politics, religion, eduction , art,
medicine, etc.) which used to describe a stage through which young
people passed on their way to
adulthood, and now characterizes
most of the people most of the
time beginning as early as eight or
nine years of age.
residuals
If you don't want to say "the
profits from the deal," you can say
"the residuals from the project"
and sound just like an admiral. Or
a lieutenant colonel. Or an ex-Iranian residualeer.
"I don't recall"
a magical phrase that instantly
exempts the speaker from any responsibility for what is being asked
about. Try this phrase when the
IRS asks about your deductions for
September, 1987

business expenses, or when your
wife asks you what you did with the
children you were supposed to
bring home from camp, or your
boss asks you what you did with the
files on United Widget. (Nagging
question: what was John Poindexter doing at the time of the famous
November finding that was so
much more important than ·getting
a presidential authorization for an
arms-hostages deal that it obliterated this business from his mind?)

For important people,
not telling the truth
is called "withholding
information," and is
different from lying.
That is because they
are important people.
shredder
a machine that quickly and almost automatically gets rid of guilty
secrets. Much easier and quicker
than a confessional. A shredder
means never having to say you're
sorry.
lying
For ordinary people, lying is not
telling the truth when you are
asked to tell the truth. For important people, not telling the truth is
called "withholding information"
and is different from lying. Because they are important people. I
once babysat a little girl who withheld information about what she
had been doing in the kitchen for
so long. She withheld it for some
minutes, until she felt so bad and
so guilty about having eaten up
what was to have been everybody's
treat that she came in wailing
"Kooooool Aiiid!" This confession
was news to nobody, since her
whole face had been covered in
cherry-colored dust the whole time.

But then, she was only four, and
apparently didn't have the sense to
know that you can go on withholding information till the cows come
home, never mind what is all over
your face.
shame
a mysterious term, now so archaic that no definition has been
found, though during the summer
of 1987, numerous people experienced symptoms that seem to indicate that, whatever this term
means, it hasn't quite disappeared.
patriotism (God and .. .)
"Although he is regularly asked
to do so, God does not take sides in
American politics, and in America
disagreement with the policies of
the government is not evidence of
lack of patriotism. I want to repeat
that. In America, disagreement
with the policies of the government
is not evidence of lack of patriotism." Senator George Mitchell,
D-Maine.

••
••

How to Read Criticism
as
metaphor

as

left
guessing right

figuring

Pegasus
by abacus
reaching into cookie jars
what is

to finger

better tasted
tongued
than fiddled with

Bradley Carpenter Davis
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Signs of Theatre
John Steven Paul
There must exist no more sincere expressions of "Eureka!" than
those that follow a playwright's discovery of a good theatrical idea.
Given the number of times one
hears people say in a sigh or a
groan "this is like a play," one
would think that there would be
numberless ideas out there waiting
to be dramatized . But the relative
paucity of good plays over, say,
2,500 years attests to the scarcity of
really good dramatic ideas.
Probably 60 per cent of a successful play is a good idea. The
summer production of The Signal
Season of Dummy Hoy at Chicago's
Commons Theatre was about 60
per cent successful. That is to say
that much of the production was
poorly executed, unfocused, and
dull. But the idea that playwrights
Allen Meyer and Michael Nowak
began with shone through the
amateurish haze and recommended
itself to us for reflection.
William Ellsworth Hoy actually
played professional baseball in the
time before the sport had become
the national pastime. He was a
superb hitter and fielder , a franchise player. Hoy was also deaf and
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mute and, in an age less sensitized
to the feelings of the handicapped ,
was nicknamed "Dummy." (A
name, by the way, of which he
came to be proud and preferred to
"William .")
Dummy Hoy broke in with the
Oshkosh, Wisconsin baseball club
of the Northwestern League. A
good portion of Hoy's career was
over by 1900; he had matured with
the sport. He came to Oshkosh before the number of bad pitches required for a base on balls was reduced from nine to four . Pitchers
had yet completely to give up the
underhand pitch in favor of an
overhand delivery. Batters could
call for a high pitch or a low pitch.
There weren't many standardized rules from league to league
but there was a good deal of unruliness among the players. Baseball
had yet to become a business and
most players had little more to gain
than a bare living wage and the fun
of playing. Though they wore uniform neckties on the field, most of
these men had but little concern
for civilized decorum or good
sportsmanship. And, of course,
their general tendency toward
brutish behavior intensified when
focused on a man who could only
express himself with his face and
hands.
This situation invites sentimental
treatment and too much of The Signal Season of Dummy Hoy is too predictable: the virtuous young man,
ennobled by his handicap, is
doubted by the crusty manager and
mistreated by his despicable teammates. But through talent, determination, and love for the game, the
deaf-mute goes on to a successfu l
baseball career and is, much later,
honored as one of the pioneers of
the game.
They say that the most important day in Dummy Hoy's signal
season was the day he convinced
the umpire to accompany his barks
of "ball" and "strike" with hand sig-

nals. As he faced the pitcher,
Dummy couldn't read the call from
the ump's lips. When he turned
around to ask for a repeat, the
pitcher would "quick-pitch" him before he could right himself.
For a time, the other players,
who were not so stupid that they
didn't realize his value to the team,
tried to relay the calls to Dummy
from the coaching box: the right
arm raised for a strike, left arm
raised for a ball. But these dolts so
often confused right and left and
were so easily distracted that the
relay system failed. So it came to
pass-the precise historical details
are lost-that William Hoy approached an umpire directly and
requested that he use hand signals
for balls and strikes. The u mpire
granted the request and signs became a part of baseball.

Dummy Hoy actually
played professional
baseball in the time
before it had become
the national pastime.
The power and depth of the idea
of a deaf player who introduces
signs to baseball is revealed when,
in the crucial moment that Dummy
makes his request to the umpire,
several levels of meaning intersect.
In that moment, 1) Dummy Hoy,
who signs to communicate, requests, in effect, that the u mpires
speak his language; 2) baseball,
which, along with the other major
professional sports, entertains the
rapt attention of so many Americans, adopts an approach to communication which is, 100 years later,
part of the essence of organized
sport; 3) Dean Patrick Cannavino,
who portrays Dummy and who is
himself deaf, is signing to Ken
Kade, who portrays the umpire; 4)
Cannavino and Kade, as actors, are
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employing gesture, a sign system
which, some would say, has always
been more important to theatrical
communication than the spoken
word; 5) every other element of the
theatrical mise-en-scene is communicating to the audience as a
sign; 6) two signing interpreters,
seated on stools upstage, are signing the spoken portion of the scene
to the hearing-impaired members
of the audience; and 7) two cultures, the speaking culture and the
signing culture, are confronting
and communicating with one
another.
(1) On the first level this clash of
cultures makes for simple but compelling melodrama. Dummy Hoy
against the baseball establishment.
It's a natural. One of the team 's
scouts has discovered Hoy in Ohio
and recognized his special ability.
The scout figures that the special
disability will be manageable. But
the owners, managers, umpires,
and players become annoyed when
they realize that Hoy's handicap
will require extra energy on their
parts. And, he's different. Not only
is he deaf, but he's intelligent, refined, modest, and kind. Troublesome and different: good reasons
to be rid of him.
But Hoy wants desperately to
play professional ball. Finally, he
parlays his talent into a grudging
respect and, in the penultimate
scene of the play, he works a
momentous compromise with the
umpire (who is also a local judge).
Now he will be able to compete on
equal terms with full-facultied players. It is a civil-rights conflict with
great dramatic potential. Look for
the movie.
(2) Most of us view our favorite
sports on television. If we are
blessed with good hearing, or corrective appliances, the non-stop
commentary may dull our sense of
the extensive signaling by umpires,
referees, managers, coaches, and
the players themselves. But all one
September, 1987

need do is attend the ball park or
the stadium to become newly aware
that signaling is as much a part of
sport as passing, pitching, or puntmg.
Signs precede, accompany, and
follow every action. Despite the fact
that everyone can see the basketball
swishing through the net, the referee raises a fist and two fingers to
signal "two points." The system of
football signals is arcane. A baseball
third-base coach signaling to his
batter could just as easily be practicing a break dance routine.

Had I not known that
Cannavino was deaf, I
might well have thought
that he was an expert
and graceful signer.
We can't help wondering about
the origin of sports signals. Now we
know. No doubt the explanation is
part fact and part myth, but then
myth has long been the starting
point for drama.
(3) I know very little about Dean
Patrick Cannavino except for what
I have read in his brief program
biography. He has been deaf since
birth. He has made one other appearance as an actor in Chicago.
While he was studying theatre at
the National Technical Institute for
the Deaf in New York, he played in
six major productions.
What the program did not need
to say was that he was handsome,
agile, and easily the most interesting actor on the stage. Since the
program told me that Cannavino is
deaf, I was aware that he had a
special disability. While the other
actors used their voices, tongues,
lips, and so forth to speak, Cannavino "spoke" with his body, his
face , and his fingers.
In general, there are three responses to the disabled performer.

If his disability is distracting or prevents the actor from fulfilling the
requirements of the role, the audience responds negatively: they patronize, compensate, or try their
best to ignore the distraction. Second, the disabled actor may be
good. Then most of the audience
becomes unconscious of any difference in his performance. Had I not
known that Cannavino was deaf, I
might well have thought that he
was an expert and graceful signer
who had worked hard to understand the role of Dummy Hoy. (I
have seen fully-sighted actors play
blind characters frequently, and if
they're good enough I simply
forget that their sightedness is a
handicap.)
Some disabled actors are able not
only to transcend their physical
condition, but to transform a disability into a special power. I recall
the first time I saw the road company production of Children of a
Lesser God at the Blackstone
Theatre in the early Eighties. It
was a generally fine production of
this moving play, but what I remember most is the signing. Most
of the company had trained with
the National Theatre for the Deaf.
Their swift and agile signing could
not be spoken of merely in terms
of expertise and grace, but of art.
I knew nothing of the denotation
of the signs and I was sitting in the
balcony of the large Blackstone
Theatre, but I recall their hands as
butterflies, flitting and lighting.
The signing itself became a
metaphor for freedom of the spirit;
talking, which some of the characters fiercely resisted, seemed cloddish and mundane by comparison.
The
special
communicative
power of another disabled actor enhanced the Goodman's recent production of She Always Said, Pablo.
Susan Nussbaum played Gertrude
Stein in this exquisite theatrical
meditation created by Frank Galati
on the writing of Stein, the images
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of Pablo Picasso, and the music of
Virgil Thompson. Nussbaum appeared Picasso's famous portrait of
the seated Gertrude Stein come to
life.
She remained seated at all times,
and managed her considerable
movement by means of a motorized
wheel chair. It occured too me only
after quite a while that Nussbaum
was actually unable to use her legs;
she is paralyzed from the waist
down. The juxtaposition of serene
cerebration and active intellection
was a perfect combination for
Stein. The paradox of immobility
in motion suggested the cubist art
that she championed.
(4) As Cannavino (Hoy) signed to
Kade (the umpire) , they displayed
two modes of communication in
high contrast. As Kade struggled to
make
Cannavino
understand
words, his frustrated gesticulations
increased, but his hands were no
more persuasive than his tongue.
Cannavino, accustomed to relying
entirely on gesture, communicated
more coherently.
Spoken word and gesture do battle in the scene and may at times
do battle within a single actor. An
incompetent actor or a young actor
at the beginning of a training program will sometimes manifest a disjunction between the words he is
speaking and the expressive motion
of his body. The mind is making
two efforts: one to move the body,
the other to say the words that
have been written by someone else.
Much of acting training is devoted
to healing that psycho-physical split
and helping the actor to produce
the word as a natural part of a
physical action.
For the signing actor, the
"words" appear indeed to be phy ically connected to the rest of the
body. There are no words to get in
the way. Undoubtedly, during the
time the mute actor is assimilating
the text, the signing is similarly disjointed. But the effort to fit the ac-
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tion to the word must be more natural. For the signing actor, the
word is a finger on the hand of
gesture.
(5) Two twentieth-century theorist-artists, Antonin Artaud and
Bertolt Brecht, not only advocated
the serious, systematic use of gesture, but insisted that gestural communication was more effective than
spoken language. For their models,
they turned to Eastern theatre
forms. For Artaud, the European
theatre which relied on the word to
represent ideas was not as pure as
the Balinese theatre which employed gesture and sign. Brecht, an
admirer of the Chinese actor and
mime Mei Lan Fang, felt that all
true theatrical communication was
gestural, showing meaning instead
of telling it.

The juxtaposition of
serene cerebration and
active intellection was
a perfect combination
for Gertrude Stein.
Brecht made brilliant use of
words, but only as a part of the
larger gestus. He and Artaud understood that the totality of theatrical communication, the macro-gesture if you will, is composed of
every sensuous element on the
stage-<:ostumes, lighting, properties, scenery, make-up, movement,
gesture, and the spoken word.
Semioticians would say simply
"all that is on stage is a sign." In
fact, a semiotic theory of theatre
identifies many distinct sign systems in use during a single theatre
event, and posits a complex interaction among those systems. The
thought of managing the information being projected from the stage
is daunting. That is, however, what
a director is expected to do.
(6) There are some theatre direc-

tors who are better able to control
the signal information on the stage
than others. (I think, for example,
of the late Alan Schneider directing
a late work of Samuel Beckett to
perfection.) But to insure that the
entire communicative transaction
between all the signs transmitting
information from the stage and the
spectators, each of whom is interpreting those signs according to a
personal set of codes, is certainly
not possible.
At best, the director must make a
series of educated guesses about
the audience's interpretive codes.
He assumes the audience's familiarity with such signal systems as language and gesture as well as scenery, stage lighting, costume, and
make-up. The director can be less
sure of the spectator's cultural
codes, which are derived from his
entire life experience. It is on the
basis of these codes that an individual interprets the signs transmitted in the course of any event,
theatrical or other.
If the communication is to have
any chance of being successful, the
audience members must not only
be able to understand the various
signs of theatre, they must also be
able to recognize the performance
as such. They must understand the
rules of the theatre game, including the rule of "framing." All initiated audiences frame, by attending to certain signs that they understand to be part of the performance, and disattending to other
signs that are not. Thus, an actor
sneezing onstage will be within the
frame, a sneezer in the audience
will be outside.
Most of us have viewed programs
or performances "signed for the
hearing-impaired ." If we are members of the hearing audience, we
are accustomed to placing the signers outside the frame. (Television,
as always, rushes to the aid of the
inept by drawing a graphic frame
around the signer and placing him
The Cresset

in a corner of the screen.)
But what about sign interpreters
in a play like The Signal Season of
Dummy Hoy? Inside or outside?
Joyce L. Cole and Paul Raci sat
roughly upstage center on the tiny
Commons Theatre stage. They
were costumed in vaguely latenineteenth-century style. They are
experts who sign not only with
hands and fingers but also face and
body. It was possible for a hearing
audience member to disattend to
the signers, but were they meant to
be outside the frame?
The Commons Theatre sign interpreters remained stationary,
making framing possible. When
The National Theatre for the Deaf
brought its beautiful production of
The Heart is a Lonely Hunter to the
VU campus last February, they deliberately made such framing impossible. There were both deaf and
hearing actors in the company, as
well as ones who spoke and ones
who did not.
As the story of the deaf-mutes
Singer and his beloved Antonapoulos unfolded, the task of interpreting was assumed by various actors
on what appeared to be a random
rotating basis. Sometimes actors
spoke for themselves; at other
times, their colleagues spoke for
them, following no discernible pattern. The result was not the chaos
that one might fear, but a choir of
actors in a polyphonic performance
of shared communication. There
was no need, and certainly no desire, to disattend to anything.
(7) Finally, in that moment when
Dummy Hoy describes to the umpire a system of signs for balls and
strikes, two cultures meet. Each has
its own language and lore, its own
way of expressing sorrow or telling
a joke. Of course, there are large
segments of the culture that overlap one another, but there is much
that is distinct.
Each conversant is proud of his
language. Each is painfully aware
September, 1987

of his limitations as a communicator. Each culture has much
to give to the other, and much to
tolerate about the other. The line
of confrontation extends from the
lighted stage into the darkened auditorium, where we sit next to them.
The bridge between the two

cultures is the sign.
Alien and exclusivistic at first, ultimately the sign of a good show is
unifying. It was always been so, for
at the beginning of a play, there
are always at least two distinct cultures; at the end of a successful
show, there is often only one. Cl

After Watching the Space Shuttle Explode
Bury the film, and let
the simple air we breathe
be marble. Over and over
they reel it back as if
asking how could we save them
seventy seconds into launch .
Surely a trick, a flash
of powder, the shuttle
suddenly gone, two solid
wobbling rockets rising
out of a cloud, like magic.
We applauded, and aaahed,
believing what happened
was planned. We've all seen
rockets part in a flash,
the second they should
then a spaceship emerge.
Smoke streamed to the ocean
and we moaned, over and over
begging oh God, oh no.
alive like us
seconds ago, then a billow
we cheered by mistake.
We shudder, fully alive
to imagine that vast
explosion, that burning,
that breaking apart of worlds.

Walter McDonald

25

Poems as Objects
Charles Vandersee
Out of himself like a thread the child spins
pain
and makes a net to catch the unknown
world.
Words gather there heavy as [ISh, and
tears,
and tales of love and of the polar cold.
Now, says the child, I shall never be
young agazn.
The shadow of my net has darkened the
sea's gold.

Dear Editor:
The last time I wrote you about
one of my favorite topics, poetry,
was over a year ago. Complaining
that the anthology I chose for a
class the next semester had the
usual faults of the genre.
Well, the anthology worked all
right. We did have to supplement it
with more poems by Emily Dickinson, Wallace Stevens, and W. B.
Yeats, and I made up handouts
with prose passages from certain
poets, on their theories and desires.
The course itself last fall went very
well.
It helps that in Dogwood we
have a "supportive atmosphere" for
poetry. The Department of English
brings in poets to read (during the
present semester we have Jay Parini, Robert Morgan, Amy Clampitt, and Louise Gluck), while

Charles Vandersee has returned to
Dogwood, Virginia, from Oregon and
Washington.
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downtown an art gallery presents
Sunday night readings for poetry
and fiction, mostly local writers,
and on Wednesdays a bookstore
does the same.
Among the visiting poets last fall
was one of our former graduate
students in writing, Richard Katrovas. He now has two books of
poems from Wesleyan University
Press, which publishes one of the
most respected series in the country. Since our budget allows for
Scotch and pretzels, I talked with
him after the reading and learned
he was staying an extra day in Dogwood. He should come to my class,
I told him, without thinking. Without thinking, he agreed.
We made no big plans and therefore earned ourselves the kind of
success based on spontaneity. The
lively, shaggy visitor, sitting at one
end of the long table, opposite the
teacher, restored to our minds a
Keats letter considered a week earlier. He recited some good things
from
memory,
including the
Gerard Manley Hopkins lament,
"Margaret, are you grieving? I
Over Goldengrove unleaving?" He
spoke about his own discovery of
poetry while a "hoodlum" in Tidewater, Virginia, and he read with
force and feeling some of his own
poems, in both traditional forms
and open form.
Then, near the end of the semester, to the Sunday series downtown
came the 1986 Pulitzer Prize poet,
Henry Taylor. Henry was still an
undergraduate when I arrived at
the University a score of years ago,
and he was accomplished already
then. My ear, ever since, has retained the music of his sestina on
the "summer girls" that boys meet
at camp; the poem is in his first
book.
He was not in town long enough
to come to class, but I brought to
class some of his poems. He too
was a success, especially with a
poem set at a large concrete park

in northern Virginia familiar to
several students. "Evening at Wolf
Trap" expertly turns an ordinary
object, a frisbee, into an arresting
symbol-as Yeats did with a ragand-bone shop. The frisbee hovers
for an instant before settling down,
symbolizing, among friends, a moment of happiness in which "all
things ceased to age." The rag-andbone shop is Yeats in old age falling back upon the human heart
and its ordinary human desires as
the source of poetry.
So thinking back on the course, I
realized I wanted to repeat it this
fall. But Emily Dickinson was our
only non-male voice, and I craved
more variety. Students did not
complain (Dogood students seldom
complain), but I myself wanted to
hear at least one more woman spinning threads and making nets.
Not Christina Rossetti, who wrote
some of the most awful hymn lyrics
of the Victorian century. Nor have
I acquired a taste for the bland understated poems of Elizabeth
Bishop. I should get to know
Muriel Rukeyser, since a former
student of mine, Kate Daniels, herself a prize-winning poet, is a great
enthusiast-in fact, writing a book
about her. I admire a lot of things
by Sylvia Plath and Anne Sexton.

Emily Dickinson was the
only non-male voice
in the course, and I
craved more variety.
But these women are all American or British. Then I remembered
Judith Wright, who will give us a
place and sensibility perhaps different from England and North
America.
These hills my father's father stripped,
and beggars to the winter wind
they crouch like shoulders naked and
whippedhumble, abandoned, out of mind.
The Cresset

Of their scant creeks I drank once
and ate sour cherries from old trees
found in their gullies fruiting by chance.
Neither fruit nor water gave my mind ease.
I dream of hills bandaged in snow,
their eyelids clenched to keep out fear.
When the last leaf and bird go
let my thoughts stand like trees here.

I first saw Judith Wright on a
shelf of unwanted books in the office of the Virginia Quarterly Review
in Dogwood: books not assigned
for review, not picked up for a
short notice, and not taken by the
university library (which had probably purchased a copy). I looked inside The Double Tree: Selected Poems
1942-1976 (Houghton Mifflin), saw
at a glance that she was good, paid
my fifty cents and brought her
home. This was in 1979; VQR remainders are now one dollar.

The poem as object is a
poem of the admirable
dishonesty we call art.
What distinguishes it,
often, from the poem of
process is that it permits
repeated reappraisal.

in Europe after college, she has
lived and worked-writing, managing property, conserving wildlifethere and in Sydney and near Brisbane. She helped run a literary
magazine at the university in Brisbane, and one sees that she has
read Yeats:
Once as I travelled through a quiet
evening,
I saw a pool, jet-black and mirror-still.
Beyond, the slender paperbarks stood
crowding;
each on its own white image looked its fill,
and nothing moved but thirty egrets
wadingthirty egrets in a quiet evening.

What 1 particularly like about
Wright-and Yeats, and Stevens
and Dickinson and Plath and Keats
and Henry Taylor and Richard
Katrovas-is that her poems are objects. They are formed, polished,
definite objects.
Does it seem odd to emphasize
the word? One of the present controversies of poetry is that of object
versus process. Regnant at this moment is process-the poem modest,
prosy, often inconclusive, purporting to be the unreflecting and
spontaneous response to a small
personal situation. Its merit is its
honesty, its truth-it is experience

rendered directly (that is, the very
process of that experience), in first
person and present tense. Rather
than the process reflected upon
and perhaps combined with knowledge of history, of other people's
experiences, and other issues entirely. As much as anyone else,
William Carlos Williams is its
father, and his children are many.
By contrast, the poem as object is
a poem of the admirable dishonesty
which we call art. What distinguishes it, often, from the poem of
process is that it permits repeated
reappraisal. True, the poem of
process often carries an urgency of
emotion that permits rehearing and
effective re-experiencing; the archetype is (curiously) by another
Wright, the James Wright of Martins Ferry on the Ohio River. His
poem "A Blessing" will always be
read with enjoyment owing to the
pain of lost innocence which it
evokes, in the encounter with two
lovely, shy Indian ponies, and especially owing to its startling last
lines:
Suddenly I realize
That if I stepped out of my body I would
break
Into blossom.

But the poem does not permit

Give The Cresset As A Thoughtful Gift
I read her through, made some
marks, went around talking about
her, and then went on to other
things. When I pulled her out a few
months ago I saw stanzas like this:
Nothing is so bare as truththat lean geometry of thought;
but round its poles there congregate
all foliage, flowers and fruits of earth.

She was fully as good as I had
thought, and this fall she will have
twenty new admirers.
Judith Wright's ancestors settled
in New South Wales, in southeast
Australia, in 1828. She was raised
on that land, distant from any
town, and, except for a year's travel
September, 1987
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much reappraisal, in the sense of a
re-experience enlarging the reader.
In selecting poems for teaching,
and for my own experience with
language, I choose mainly "the
poem as object." I seldom teach
James Wright or William Carlos
Williams, though I recommend
such poets to students who wish to
see what in our moment is most admired.
What is admired at the moment-the moment stretching from
Joseph McCarthy on down through
Vietnam and Watergate to Iranian
arms deals-is truth . Truth being
scarce in politics, people try to
place it in poems.
But truth, as Judith Wright says,
is "bare." It is a curious thing; in
architecture and design I do crave
the "bare"-give me Mies van der
Rohe, give me the simple lines and
bright light woods of Scandinavian
furniture. But in poems I need the
complexity of earth-dirt and soil
(rags and bones transfigured) and,
rising out of it, Judith Wright's
"foliage, flowers and fruits ."

What is admired at the
moment-the moment
stretching from Joseph
McCarthy on down to Iran
arms deals-is truth.
Craving of complexity is not an
obsolete adherence to the New
Criticism. At Valparaiso Univerity
in the 1950s we did pay carefu l attention to individual poems as objects, but we were not indoctrinated
into irony, ambiguity, and Brooksand-Warren. I have not had New
Critical shackles to break, as far as
I can tell, so that I respect the care
such critics brought to the poem-asobj ect, rather than join in the present-moment cry of disdain. The
thing is, leaving cant aside, most
poems are objects, though of course
not only objects.
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R equest to a Year
If the year is meditating a suitable gift,
I should like it to be the attitude
of my great-great-grandmother,
legendary devotee of the arts,
who, having had eight children
and little opportunity for painting
pictures,
sat one day on a high rock
beside a river in Switzerland
and from a difficult distance viewed
her second son, balanced on a small
ice-floe,
drift down the current towards a waterfall
that struck rock-bottom eighty feet below,
while her second daughter, impeded,
no doubt, by the petticoats of the day,
stretched out a last-hope alpenstock
(which luckily later caught him on his
way).
Nothing, it was evident, could be done;
and with the artist's isolating eye
my great-great-grandmother hastily
sketched the scene.
The sketch survives to prove the story by.
Year, if you have no Mother's day present
planned;
reach back and bring me the firmness of
her hand.

Liking that poem suggests why I
don't actively dislike Elizabeth
Bishop and James Wright, though
I often find them bare. The narrative is characteristic of Bishop (see
her "Large Bad Picture"), but I
think she would have stopped before the splendid closure, leaving
emotion to be inferred. That
strong conclusion does remind me
of James Wright's poem mentioned
above, except that the formality of
the rhyme conveys a power that
comes from the act of planning
that rhyme, whereas a prose exclamation has only the power of spontaneity. To put it another way,
James Wright remains at the fence,
momentarily transfigured (the frisbee hovering), while Judith Wright
wou ld vault across, into a passionate permanent transfigurement.
She tells us what it feels like to
think, not just what it feels like to
feel.

What I say here in confidence
would of course be attacked by
poets and critics of different commitments and tastes from mine.
And by readers with similar inclinations but with different responses
to the poems cited. Controversy
and taste are like flowers and
foliage-we cannot always know
where the roots are.

What I say here in
confidence would of
course be attacked by
poets and critics of
different commitments
and tastes from mine.
But I am not going to fight
Judith Wright's battle, or place her
in Anglo-American categories. I
will merely present her to students
as worth attention , as a person able
to fill some of the space inside the
mind, which is what I require of
the other poets chosen. Too many
of the poets of the present moment
cannot or will not do that.
And often too, in service to
truth-the truth of a small personal
moment-poets of the moment sacrifice one last matter, which one really hesitates to mention , since it is
so long out of favor (though I
notice it creeping back into critical
discourse, as reviewers compliment
such writers as James Merrill and
yet
another
Wright,
Charles
Wright). I mean music.
Bring me that harp, that singer. Let him
smg.
Let something fill the space inside the
mind,
that's a dry stream-bed for the flood of
f ear.
Song's only sound; but it's a lovely sound,
a fountain through the drought. Bring
David here,
said the old frightened king.

From Dogwood, yours faithfu lly,
Cl
C.V.
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Review Essay

Weaving a
Drama of Faith
Warren Rubel

The Orphean Passages
By Walter Wangerin, Jr. San
Francisco: Harper & Row. 304
pp. $14.95.
Walter Wangerin , Jr., first received national recognition almost a
decade ago with The Book of the Dun
Cow (1978) , which The N ew York
Times selected as Best Children's
Book of the Year and which also
won the American Book Award for
the Best Science Fiction Paperback
in 1980. Wangerin has subsequently published Ragman and
Other Cries of Faith ( 1984) and The
Book of Sorrows (1985), a formidable
sequel to The Book of the Dun Cow .
The Orphean Passages and a recently
released collection of poetry, A
Miniature Cathedral, are further
signs of Wangerin's maturing productivity.
In Orphean Passages Wangerin attempts to move beyond fable and
religious story to a more complicated weaving together of at least
three main narrative strands-the

Warren Rubel is Professor of
Humanities in Christ College at Valparaiso University.
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retelling of the Greek myth of Orpheus, the recent story of Pastor
Orpheus and his representative
"passion" in an inner-city church,
and, more loosely, but integr;d to
the drama of faith the author
shapes, the narrator's glosses and
commentary on the meaning and
significance of his coinhering
stories.
Ideally, it seems to me, one
ought to read Wangerin's main
works in sequence, for what
makes The Orphean Passages unconventional as literature is Wangerin's
bringing together story and literary
oratory. If we continue with the
weaver image, we see how the myth
of Orpheus provides a necessary
framework for Pastor Orpheus'
passages. This relationship is not
one of mere prototype or antitype
to type, nor a matter of Wangerin's
introducing a form of "figural" interpretation into his own work.
Rather, each story corresponds and
differs in its context and application and in precisely those ways
that require the weaver to do his
work and to comment on it.
The Orpheus myth provides a
flexible but controlled schema for
Pastor Orpheus' story. More accurately perhaps, the myth of Orpheus provokes both dialogue and
dialectic between classical myth and
Christian story, a contest for our
participating and understanding
the nooks and crannies of everyman and everywoman's faithful
quest and journey.
Wangerin legitimizes his strategy
with an opening quotation from
the second century saint, Justin
Martyr: "Whatever things were
rightly said by any man, belong to
us Christians. For those writers
were able to see reality darkly,
through the seed of the Word
planted within them." This happy
inclusiveness gives The Orphean
Passages a special kind of historical
resonance and reflective depth.
Wangerin offers his reader six

distinguishable stages on faith's
way: to experience the transporting
love of God in ways similar to Orpheus' love and response to
Eurydice; to feel great loss or the
death of Christ as Orpheus lost
Eurydice; to search with hope in
the place of the lost and with the
lost as Orpheus descended to search
for Eurydice in the realm of the
dead; to experience "faithing" as
believing without seeing in the dark
ascent as Orpheus, without looking
back, sought to lead Eurydice out
of the realm of the dead; to know
the fear and terror of one's own
nothingness and death in ways not
completely different from Orpheus'
having again lost Eurydice; to live
by faith through the Resurrection
in ways both like and joyfully different from Orpheus' final reuniting with Eurydice in the realm of
the dead. Wangerin ends his work
with an epigraph from I John 1,
annealing the completed joy expressed there with himself as scriptor, or writer, and lector, or reader.

Wangerin tries to hold
together the furious rush
of life in order to
grasp some of its
meaning and significance.
A recitation of the schematic connections does injustice to the more
complicated and compelling ritual
of participation both expected and
required of the reader. For Wangerin attempts to hold together the
furious rush and motion of life in
order to grasp with words some of
its meaning and significance. Because words slip, slide, congeal and
fall apart, ambiguously reveal and
conceal, Wangerin places before his
ordinary reader a rather extended
prologue on his and our human
predicament when we write or read
or think about the ineluctable relationships between life or raw ex29

perience and language.
"Look," writes Wangerin about
the verb "faithing," a verb more
acutely describing lived Christianity
than the noun "faith," "even I am
pretending fixedness in this very
act of writing a book for you , supposing my words still to contain
some meaning by the time you
come to them to bleed them of that
meaning. And I trust the pretense,
that not all the blood's run out before you arrive." There is then a
covenanted risk between writer and
reader that beseeches participation,
performance, appropriation on our
part.
What then commends this work
to our energy and juices of feeling
and mind? First of all, if one has
read any of Wangerin's earlier
works, one continues to hear the
same
richly
modulated
and
eloquent speaking voice. Wangerin,
for example, is perhaps more effective as story teller when he writes
under classical constraint. He keeps
his lyrical gifts and his intensity
controlled so that we feel an almost
elegant ease in his rehearsal of the
deeply moving story of Orpheus
and Eurydice.
In addition there are, of course,
repeated and sensitively altered
motifs. In The Orphean Passages
Wangerin renders more humanly
explicit what he worked with indirectly through fable in Chauntecleer's quest with Pertelote and her
community of hens and sundry
barnyard folk-a quest for justice
and peace and eventual forgiveness
in The Book of the Dun Cow and The
Book of Sorrows.
R. P. Blackmur has pointed out
that in contemporary American
poetic religious sensibility there continues a double concern: a long
and arduous pursuit for light at the
end of the journey and a crushing
certainty that the darkness through
which the poet journeys is overwhelmingly near. Pastor Orpheus'
journey and Wangerin's commen-
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tary on these concerns offer the
reader another telling of that
spiritual quest in contemporary
Christian terms . Because Orpheus
and Pastor Orpheus and Wangerin
sing their words to enchant animate and inanimate ears alike, one
necessarily pauses before the more
obvious pleasures that Wangerin
brings to melodious language and
sometimes to coarse and brutal
words.

There is a covenanted
risk between writer and
reader that beseeches
participation, activity,
appropriation on our part.
Aside from the well-crafted telling of the Orphean passage, furthermore , Pastor Orpheus' story
and the embedded stories of the
inner-city people who love, sustain,
stun, and redeem him, make this
work worth patient reading. I liked
particularly Mrs. Allouise Story's
story because of her relentlessly
stubborn and graceful synergism.
When Pastor Orpheus urges on the
widowed and failing Mrs. Story
that "God is a merciful God, after
all," she offers her rejoinder as she
struggles up the steps in the clean
and orderly home that leads to the
room she shared with her husband,
"Well, let's say that he's keeping the
bannister from breaking, but it's
me that's doing the pulling."
Because Wangerin writes of what
he has suffered and learned, of his
people and the cadences of lived
speech, the words and images of
those
people-streetwise,
victimized, compassionate, and outraged-sometimes beat like hammerblows on our heads, their
words and predicaments striking at
the religious and moral and imaginative inertia in our human hearts.
The fictions, the pretense, here

take on more reality than the living
celebrities that move daily and
quickly to extinction across the colored mist of the media screens in
our living rooms and dens.
If the reader, moreover, happens
to be a Christian within a historical and liturgical tradition , and if
he or she has known some of the
genuine delight, mumacy, and
laughter of having been reared in a
good home, where parents could
be kind and gentle and good-humored; and if families in these
homes were bonded relatively close
in congregational life, intermingling
the taste of bread and wine in the
sacrament with people rejoicing
and sorrowing at once-well then
Wangerin writes about these kinds
of experiences and memories with
genuine feeling.
True, the story and its telling occasionally appear as naive as Pastor
Orpheus' initial piety, but because
our
teller
and
commentator
watches himself telling that story,
we can always take the proper step
backward because Wangerin's commentary is a kind of framing device, releasing us from too easy an
identification with story and characters.
Our
narrator,
furthermore,
preacher and orator that he may
be, also knows the Singing School
in the Western Tradition as well as
some of the exhaustive normative
and theological commentary on
Scripture in that tradition. Because
Wangerin steps forward to comment on the narrative in order to
explicate the drama of faith, one
might be put off by the occasional
allusive density informing the text.
For example, unless one already
knows George Herbert's poem
"Easter Wings" and unless one is
familiar with an archaic term from
falconry like "imping," the grafting
on of feathers to further flight,
Wangerin's use of the allusion may
strike the reader as deliberate
obscurantism. At the same time the
The Cresset
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allusion IS appropnate to Mrs. Atlouise's story and to the tradition.
It quietly enriches the reader's
grasp of the "perfect paradox" that
Wangerin expands on in the fourth
stage of faith's way, where the believer is called upon to believe
when believing seems pointless.
Only there where "she can truly
imp her wings on Jesus'. God is
doing a new thing, however hurtful
it may seem. She is moving toward
the fall which finally shall further
her flight."
At other points Wangerin introduces Scriptural distinctions and insights that both attest to his own
spiritual struggle and evolving wisdom and to the need for bringing
these applications to readers less
familiar with a tradition of a
learned and eloquent ministry.
Because Wangerin tries to do
many things in this unconventional
work our response will probably
depend on our expectations and
our own willingness to expand our
reading "conventions" to include
the kind of literary oratory Wangerin delivers in The Orphean Passages. Apparently wishing to be
both mother and midwife to his
work, he does not cut the feeding
tubes entirely from his work or separate his artistic intention from direct
statements to and for his audience.
f My own response remains ambivalent and provisional. I think I
would more likely reread The Book
of the Dun Cow or The Book of Sorrows. But The Orphean Passages
necessarily brings theological closure to some of the unresolved
problems raised in the earlier fables.
I think that Wangerin tries in
The Orphean Passages to bring his
readers to the transforming power
and joy of the Christian faith in a
culturally pertinent way. The efficacy of story rests in its oblique but
immediate freeing effect. Story
frees and perhaps flatters (as well
as puzzles and confounds) the
September, 1987

reader's capacity to respond to
story, to metaphor and symbol.
This problem is not merely a
matter of telling or showing.
Rather it is a matter of the "purity"
of telling in those written forms
which come closer to persuasive
speech or literary oratory. Story
images and symbols generate their
own "iconic augmentation," to use
a bit of useful critical jargon from
Paul Ricoeur. That is, there is a
surplus of meaning available in
written discourse, particularly in
language prompted by those boundary situations which lead to
human
reflection
and
which
Wangerin writes of so effectively.
Any schematization and the commentary it produces are bound,
consequently, to constrain the
reader to attend primarily to the
meaning and significance the author as narrator intends. The procedure is at worst "preachy," at best
an enriching and complicated form
of exhortation. Fortunately any author as narrator and commentator
may find resistances generated by
his or her own story and commentary.
In The Orphean Passages there
surface these interference nodes
that carry us from commentary to

story and back again to reflective
thought because Wangerin raises
his own questions at a number of
points. He struggles, for example,
with St. John of the Cross! Wangerin's "gentle, loving quarrel" is with
St. John and any spirituality which
abstracts itself from "the stuff and
tumble of physical human existence. [St. John of the Cross'] sense
of experience is spiritual purely, as
though it took place in a monk's
cell only, apart from the marketplace."
We gradually discern, of course,
that what may be true of St. John
of the Cross' spirituality may also
be true of Pastor Orpheus. He
needs to be "redeemed" by Christian friends who love him to the
end in ways that he "knew" but did
not understand until God in his
love had worked his "faithing"
through the passages to Pentecost.
That Wangerin takes up this
quest and his commentary in a culture and marketplace where both
his kind of art and his theological
concerns run across the grain is a
tribute to the man, to his editors
and publishers, and possibly to the
"fit and few" Wangerin continues
to address in his expanding and
important work.

••
••

four years gone
years fall.
our parting under pink blossoms, distant,
terra-cotta figures glassed in,
flesh outraged
at the strength of seasons.
we move on, flicker as history.
where does God keep us?
-our obscure length of finished days,
our fumbled words.

Margot Cullen
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Holidays
Dot Nuechterlein
As I write this, it is the Fourth of
July, which explains the title. My
memories of holidays are mostly
great, but they blend together-it is
the less ordinary ones that stick in
the mind.
My best Independence Day was
on foreign soil. (Funny how absence makes the heart grow patriotic.) After college I was on an overseas youth exchange, and on July
4th, in Germany, a friend and I
considered celebrating. We thought
we should at least sing the Star
Spangled Banner, but we needed a
flag to do it right.
I had some little kids' bandaids-blue, with white starsbrought for children I might meet;
my friend had a red wallet. We cut
some paper into strips, pasted them
and a band-aid on the wallet, stuck
a pencil through the contraption,
and saluted our little Stars-&Stripes as we sang. It was probably
the first time I ever paid attention
to the words.
My second most memorable
Fourth was that Sunday in 1976,
Bicentennial Day, when I lived in
Canada. My family didn't own a
color TV, so we rented one for
July to watch the Bicentennial specials and the Montreal Olympics.
I went to church in a red, white,
and blue dress, then didn 't budge
from the tube all day, watching the
whole U.S. celebrate. I have seen
spectacular fireworks , but the best
ever were in Washington and ew
York and Boston and St. Louis and
everywhere else the TV took us
that night. Sometime in the midst
of it all I decided that someday,
back home, I would like to run for
public office-and now I am.

There are dozens of good Christmas times in my head, most concerning family and friends. The
crucial one, though, was at age
twelve. I vividly recall observing my
younger brother and sisters delighting in their presents and thinking to myself: "I believe I am no
longer a child."
I definitely was not one the night
I had too much New Year's Eve
champagne, but I sure do remember that party! And I'm not
talking.
Easter is my favorite religious
holiday, but two well-remembered
ones were far from sacred. Once I
worked in an inner-city congregation, living in the run-down house
next to the run-down church in
that run-down neighborhood. Having stayed up very late the night
before with friends and gotten up
very early for sunrise services, by
afternoon my husband and I needed
a nap. It got dark while we slept;
the place probably looked deserted.
I woke to see the bedroom window opening and a stranger's head
entering. The man beside me
thought I was dreaming when I
poked him , until he noticed the intruder. We both yelled, the man
fled , and we called the cops. An officer came and listened to our
story, shaking his head.
"Look," he said, "we can't catch
these guys if you scare them off
like that. ext time let him get inside the house, okay? Then hit him
over the head with a bat or something, and then call us. You can
even kill him-just don't scare him
away, or we can't help you."
The other Easter wasn't so
dramatic; I hesitate to bring it up,
but it does linger in the mind. Several years ago we were getting
ready for my least favorite church
service, a 5 a.m. Easter Vigil. Let
me tell you, folks, you have not
lived unless you have groped
around at 4:15 in the wee hours,
everyone in Easter finery, house

guests and all, when the toilet decides to overflow. Frankly, I
haven't been back to a Vigil since.
Then there was that one Feb.
14th. I was gone all day, so it was
late before I delivered a rather
mushy Valentine to my "roommate." The late sports news was
just over, and reading the card he
smiled contentedly. "Isn't life wonderful!" he exclaimed. "My wife
loves me and Michigan beat Iowa."
Ah well, at least he put me first .
There's another event I associate
with July 4th, even though it happened in June. We went to an old
Canadian fort for a concert which
was to end with the 1812 Overture,
complete with muskets and cannons and all-typical Fourth fare.
The kids wouldn't sit through con- •
cert hall performances, but we
hoped this would stuff some culture into them. They knew the
Overture because Dad blasted it on
the stereo whenever Mom was
gone.
The early part of the program
dragged, and everyone became increasingly aware of thunder. The
orchestra upped tempo on the
third last piece, the conductor announced they would skip the next
one, and they swung into the
1812-just as the sky opened.
You should have been there: the •
performers played faster as the
rain fell harder, but the storm was
winning. Soon half the orchestra
stopped playing to hold umbrellas
over the valiant few still tooting
and sawing. Muskets sizzled, cannons roared, bells pealed-but at
the final note, no cheering sounded
and no bows were taken as the conductor, musicians, soldiers, and audience ran for cover in the wildest
exit imaginable.
Today that scene flashes before
my eyes, and since there may never
be another like it, I consider it to
be an Honorable Mention holiday
memory. It seems to fit right m
with the others.

C:

The Cresset

